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THE GENETIC INFORMATION
NONDISCRIMINATION ACT AS AN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
Jessica L. Roberts*
This Article provides the first in-depth readingof the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) as an antidiscrimination statute. GINA,
touted as the first major civil rights legislation of the new century, passed in
May 2008. Thus, both to understand GINA's potential impact, as well as to
improve its efficacy, the statute must be analyzed as an antidiscriminationlaw.
When read as an antidiscriminationstatute, GINA takes a clearposition on
one of the most contested issues in that area of law: antisubordinationversus
anticlassification. This debate queries whether antidiscriminationlaw should
seek to elevate the social status of certain subordinatedgroups or should prevent
all consideration of particularforbidden characteristics. GINA as currently
draftedplainly favors anticlassification;it protects individualsfrom any intentional differential treatment by health insurers or employers based on genetic
information. In contrast, an antisubordinationapproach to protectinggenetic
information would focus not on outlawing allforms of intentional, differential
treatment, but on preventing a genetic underclassfrom forming. In particular,
an antisubordinationframework would allow employers to consider genetic
informationfor accommodation purposes and victims of discriminationto challenge facially neutralpolicies that produce discriminatoryresults. This Article
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proposes that amending GINA to include more antisubordinationprotections
would better safeguard genetic information.
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INTRODUCTION

Genetic-information discrimination captures the imagination. It
conjures images of gloomy dystopias in which the content of our
genes determines the outcome of our lives. In this troubling vision of
the future, our education, careers, incomes, relationships, and myriad
other social, economic, and personal goods depend solely on our
genetic material. Yet while this world might appear largely hypothetical, the possibility of genetic-information discrimination exists outside
Orwellian fantasy. The fear that potential discriminators might use
heredity in making decisions about our lives also feels uncomfortably
familiar, reminiscent of a time when the State could sterilize a person
against her will in the name of the public good. Failing to protect
genetic information at once portends a bleak future and recalls an
unfortunate past.
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Congress debated the issues surrounding the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) 1 for close to thirteen years before
passing the statute in a near-unanimous vote in May 2008.2

Ulti-

mately, it drafted GINA as civil rights legislation, intended to outlaw a
burgeoning form of discrimination. 3 Specifically, GINA prohibits discrimination on the basis of genetic information in health insurance
and employment. Title I prohibits health insurers from using genetic
information for determining eligibility or premiums and from requiring genetic testing. 4 Title II proscribes employers from hiring, firing,
classifying, or otherwise disadvantaging employees on the basis of
5
genetic information.
Congress's choice to draft GINA as civil rights legislation shapes
both how we must analyze and apply GINA. This Article argues that
antidiscrimination law provides the proper theoretical framework for
understanding and critiquing GINA. Reading GINA using traditional
antidiscrimination theory reveals the statute's weaknesses, as well as
possibilities for remedying those shortcomings.
1 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
2 The Senate passed GINA 95-0 on April 24, 2008. See 154 CONG. REc. S3374
(daily ed. Apr. 24, 2008). The House then approved the measure 414-1 with Congressman Ron Paul as the lone dissenter on May 1, 2008. See 154 CONG. REC.
H2979-80 (daily ed. May 1, 2008). On May 21, 2008, President George W. Bush
signed GINA into law. See Remarks on Signing the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 44 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 736 (May 21, 2008). The Senate had
also unanimously passed the bill in 2005. See 151 CONG. REC. S1595 (daily ed. Feb. 17,
2005). GINA has a complicated legislative history; advocates of genetic-information
legislation began proposing bills in the early nineties with a new bill introduced in
each subsequent Congress until GINA finally passed in 2008. See Mark A. Rothstein,
Is GINA Worth the Wait?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 174 (2008). See generally Jessica L.
Roberts, PreemptingDiscrimination:Lessons from the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act, 63 VANO. L. REV. 439, 442-51 (2010) (discussing GINA's legislative and political
history).
3 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, § 2.
See id. §§ 101-106.
Section 202 makes it unlawful for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any employee, or otherwise
to discriminate against any employee with respect to the compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the employee, because of
genetic information with respect to the employee; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify the employees of the employer in any
way that would deprive or tend to deprive any employee of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the status of the employee as an
employee, because of genetic information with respect to the employee.
Id. § 202.
4
5
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Since its passage, GINA has failed to attract much attention from
antidiscrimination scholars. 6 This lack of scholarly attention is perhaps because GINA differs from all previous antidiscrimination statutes. First and foremost, genetic information is fundamentally unlike
other antidiscrimination categories. It does not, at present, form the
basis of a widely recognized social group, nor does it currently have an
associated identity. 7 Moreover, genetic-information discrimination is
not yet occurring on a large scale.8 Thus, instead of reacting to
existing discrimination in the past and present, GINA anticipates discrimination in the future, making it the first predominantly forwardlooking antidiscrimination statute.9
Although genetic information differs substantially from traditional antidiscrimination categories like race, sex, or disability, antidiscrimination theory provides a useful lens for examining its protection.
6 Of the over one hundred law review and legal journal articles mentioning
GINA since the statute passed in May 2008, only a handful have come from employment discrimination scholars, analyzing the law from an antidiscrimination perspective. See, e.g., Teneille R. Brown, Double Helix, Double Standards: Private Matters and
Public People, 11J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 295 (2008); Sharon Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); Pauline T. Kim,
Regulating the Use of Genetic Information: Perspectivesfrom the U.S. Experience, 31 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 693 (2010); Roberts, supra note 2; Rothstein, supra note 2, at 177;
Mark A. Rothstein, GINA, the ADA, and Genetic Discrimination in Employment, 36 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 837 (2008). However, GINA has been the subject of several student
notes and comments. See, e.g., Patricia Alten, Note, GINA: A Genetic Information NondiscriminationSolution in Search of a Problem, 61 FLA. L. REv. 379 (2009);Joanne Barken,
Note, Judging GINA: Does the Genetic Information NondiscriminationAct of 2008 Offer Adequate Protection?, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 545 (2009); Rhonda B. Evans, Recent Development, "Striking Out". The Genetic Information NondiscriminationAct of 2008 and Title II's
Impact on Professional Sports Employers, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 205 (2009); Joan E. Flaherty, Comment, Toxicogenomics and Workers' Compensation: A Reworking of the "Bargain"?, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 267 (2009); Amy Foster, Comment, Critical
Dilemmas in Genetic Testing: Why Regulations to Protect the Confidentiality of Genetic Information Should Be Expanded, 62 BAYLOR L. REv. 537 (2010); Erin Murphy Hillstrom, Comment, May An Employer Require Employees to Wear "Genes" in the Workplace? An Exploration
of Title II of the Genetic Information NondiscriminationAct of 2008, 26J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 501 (2009);JenniferJ. Lee, Note, The First Civil Rights Act of the 21st
Century: Genetic Information NondiscriminationAct of 2008, 4 ISJLP 779 (2008); Jeffrey S.
Morrow, Note, Insuring Fairness: The Popular Creation of Genetic Antidiscrimination,98
GEO. L.J. 215, 245 (2009); Recent Legislation, 122 HARv. L. REv. 1038 (2009).
7 See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text; see also Kim, supra note 6, at
698 ("[I]ndividuals with genetic predispositions to disease do not even constitute an
identifiable social group."). But see infra note 112. It appears that kinds of genetic
identity groups may be starting to form; however, "genetic identity" as a concept is not
yet on par with racial, ethnic, gender, or disability identity.
8 See infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
9 See Roberts, supra note 2, at 441.
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In the 1960s and 1970s, following Brown v. Board of Education,'0
antidiscrimination scholars began pondering what should be at the
heart of the American antidiscrimination project: (1) elevating the
social status of subordinated groups or (2) preventing any decisionspositive or negative-based on certain forbidden traits. These two differing iterations of the antidiscrimination principle became known as
antisubordination and anticlassification, respectively.
In seeking to improve the social status of subjugated groups, the
antisubordination principle advocates positive differential treatment
and claims for both intentional and unintentional discrimination. For
example, an antisubordination approach to racial discrimination
would allow positive differential treatment, such as affirmative action
and diversity initiatives while outlawing both outright discrimination
and policies that unwittingly produce racial disparities. Because no
socially recognized group of genetically disadvantaged people exists at
present, an antisubordination approach to protecting genetic information would seek to prevent the formation of a genetic underclass.
Conversely, the anticlassification principle supports prohibiting all
intentional differentiation on the basis of a protected trait. In the
context of race, an anticlassification approach would forbid any
explicit consideration of race-positive or negative-including affirmative action and diversity initiatives and would allow facially neutral
policies that inadvertently produce racially disparate results. Likewise,
anticlassification protection for genetic information would prohibit
entities from ever considering genetic information for any reason.
As written, GINA favors anticlassification: it bans all consideration
of genetic information and does not allow disparate impact actions.
This Article argues that GINA could benefit from incorporating more
antisubordination protections. In particular, the antisubordination
principle supports amending GINA to allow positive differential treatment for accommodation purposes and challenges to facially neutral
policies with discriminatory results. Moreover, by targeting the formation of a genetic underclass, antisubordination would lead to more
consistent, comprehensive protection for genetic information.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I explores the reasons
behind protecting genetic information. Part II analyzes how Congress
used antidiscrimination law to protect genetic information and examines the statute's current protections. Part III reads GINA using the
traditional antidiscrimination principles of anticlassification and
antisubordination, concluding that GINA could benefit from incorporating more antisubordination protections.
10 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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UNDERSTANDING GENETIC INFORMATION

Before parsing GINA, it is useful to take a step back and examine
why genetic information warrants protection. Genetic-information
discrimination-at least as conceived by GINA '-is not yet occurring
on a widespread basis. 12 Only three federal cases dealt with geneticinformation discrimination prior to GINA. 13 Furthermore, despite
the numerous state statutes in force for decades, 14 no genetic-information employment discrimination cases had been filed when GINA
passed in 2008.15 Critics of GINA argued that discriminating on the
11 As later discussed, GINA protects against discrimination on the basis of an individual's genetic information, but not against discrimination on the basis of a manifested genetic condition. Thus, many historical examples of genetic-information
discrimination-such as the forced sterilization of people with disabilities-would in
fact not fall under GINA's definition. Instead, they would be considered discrimination on the basis of genetically based disabilities.
12 I have argued elsewhere that genetic-information discrimination is not currently happening at rates comparable to the discrimination that prompted the passing of other employment discrimination statutes, such as Title VII, the Age
Discrimination in Education Act (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), making GINA the first preemptive antidiscrimination statute in American history. See Roberts, supranote 2, at 441; see also Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discriminationand Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REv. 241, 245
(2006) ("Genetic discrimination is rare and apparently on the decline."). The "optin" nature of genetic information could, in part, explain the low levels of current
discrimination. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
13 See Roberts, supra note 2, at 464-66 (discussing Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence
Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998), EEOC v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 2002 WL 32155386 (E.D. Wis. May 8, 2002), and Terri Sergeant's ADA claim with
the EEOC).
14 See Genetic Employment Laws, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATUREs, http://www.
ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14280 (last updated Jan. 2008).
15 See Nat'l Human Genome Research Inst., The Role of the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRJ) in the Federal Legislative Process, GENOME.GOV, http://
www.genome.gov/12513974 (last visited Apr. 21, 2011); see also The Genetic Information
NondiscriminationAct: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce on H.R. 493, 110th Cong. 37 (2007) [hereinafter Hearingon H.R. 493] (statement of BurtonJ. Fishman, Fortney & Scott, LLC) (noting that no genetic discrimination cases had been filed in over thirty states with such laws). Since GINA's
employment provisions became effective in November 2009, only one claim that deals
explicitly with discrimination has garnered significant media attention. See BARRY R.
FuRROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 189 (6th ed. 2010) ("In the first five months after it
became effective, about 80 claims of genetic discrimination in the workplace had
been filed with the EEOC. While most of these cases involved allegations of an
employer inappropriately obtaining or releasing genetic information, at least one
high profile case in 2010 involved a claim by a woman who alleged that she was fired
by her employer after she had a double mastectomy."); see also Steven Greenhouse,
Ex-Wor*er Says Her Firing Was Based on Genetic Test, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2010, at A12
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basis of genetic information was a practical impossibility: we simply do
16

not know enough about genetic science to use it to discriminate.
This limited history of discrimination raises an interesting question: if
entities were not using genetic information to discriminate (at least
not to a significant degree), why would Congress pass a federal statute
protecting genetic information? This Part provides some of the practical and normative justifications behind safeguarding genetic information absent large-scale, current discrimination.
A.

Fear of Genetic-InformationDiscrimination

Although Congress likely had multiple motivations for enacting
GINA, 1 7 alleviating fear was one of the statute's major objectives. 18
Despite the limited examples of genetic-information discrimination,
more than ninety percent of Americans expressed concern regarding
the misuse of their genetic information. 19 They feared that, if given
access, potential discriminators would use genetic information to
make decisions. For example, a health insurer could use an insured's
genetic information in the underwriting or rating process. Thus, if a
person is at an increased genetic risk for developing cancer, a health
insurer might increase her premium or even deny coverage based on
that risk. Similarly, an employer could use an employee's genetic
information in making an employment-related decision. For instance,
an employer may choose not to hire an individual with a heightened
proclivity for developing cancer because that person could have an
(discussing Pamela Fink's allegation that her employer improperly fired her following
her preventive double mastectomy).
16 See Colin S. Diver &Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong with Genetic
Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1476-77 (2001).

17 In a previous article, I proposed that Congress had two primary motivations in
passing GINA: a research justification-geared toward alleviating fear surrounding
genetic testing-and an antidiscrimination justification. See Roberts, supra note 2, at
471-80.
18 See Robert Klitzman,
Genetic Disease, 19 J. GENETIC

Views of Discrimination Among Individuals Confronting
68, 69 (2010); Roberts, supra note 2, at 471-74;

COUNS.

see also Bernstein, supra note 12, at 288 ("[T]he failure of the current patchwork of
state and federal laws in affecting individuals' public fears points to the need for a
comprehensive federal statute."); Kim, supra note 6, at 699 ("GINA, then, is more
about addressing the perception or fear of genetic discrimination than reversing any
present reality of such discrimination.").
19 See Hearing on H.R 493, supra note 15, at 44 (statement of Kathy Hudson,
Director, Genetics and Public Policy Center); see also Karen H. Rothenberg & Sharon
F. Terry, Before It's Too Late--AddressingFearof Genetic Information, 297 SCIENCE 196, 196
(2002) (citing studies documenting the fear surrounding genetic testing); Daniel
Schlein, New Frontiersfor Genetic Privacy Law: The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of 2008, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 311, 315-16 (2009) (same).
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adverse effect on the cost of employer-provided health insurance.
Alternatively, an employer might choose not to promote that individual because she could become sick at some point in the future and
eventually need to be replaced. Not surprisingly, survey respondents
expressed the desire to keep their genetic information private from
their employers, their health insurers, researchers, law enforcement,
and even their doctors and spouses. 20 This anxiety led people to
avoid genetic testing because they feared that it could harm them 2 l or
their loved ones. 22 (Whether the fear surrounding genetic testing is
legitimate is completely irrelevant so long as that fear results in realworld consequences. 23
20

See

)

GENETICS & PUB. POL'Y CTR., U.S. PUBLIC OPINION ON USES OF GENETIC

1-3 (2007) [hereinafter U.S. PUBLIC OPINhttp://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/GINAPublic-OpinionGeneticInformationDiscrimination.pdf (surveying 1199 adults eighteen and over regarding their
fears surrounding access to their genetic test results).
21 See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,466 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164)
(quoting Sen. Patrick Leahy) (explaining that one-third of women offered a genetic
test for breast cancer declined out of fear of discrimination); Email from John Quillin, Genetic Counselor, to Amanda Sarata (Sept. 9, 2004, 10:59 AM), reproduced in
SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SoC'Y, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES ON GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 93 (2004) [hereinafter PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES] ("[F]ear of discrimination is a prevalent and influential concern among actual or would-be genetic counseling patients."); Bernstein, supra note
12, at 261 ("[R] esearch has shown that fear of genetic discrimination by insurers and
employers is the primary barrier against testing."); Klitzman, supra note 18, at 77-78
(describing the effect of fear of discrimination on genetic testing and treatment
decisions).
22 See Carolyne Park, Genetics Offers Tool in Combat of Cancer, ARK DEMOCRATGAzET E, Aug. 24, 2008, at 1 (quoting Dr. Kent McKelvey) (noting that genetic tests
are "fundamentally different from traditional medical tests" because of their immediate impact on family members); see also PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 21, 20-21
(testimony of Carolina Hinestrosa, a breast cancer survivor and Executive Vice President of National Breast Cancer Coalition) (explaining that she avoided genetic testing out of fear that it might negatively impact her daughter); Olympia J. Snowe,
INFORMATION AND GENETIC DISCRIMINATION

ION],

Genetic Non-Discrimination-Timeto Act to Protect Our Privacy,

OLYMPIA

J. SNOWE: U.S.

(July 16, 2004), http://snowe.senate.gov/wsu07-16-04.htm (describing a constituent's letter in which a mother declined genetic testing out of concern
for her daughter).
23 See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 288 (noting that in the context of AIDS testing
"reducing the actual level of risk would not necessarily reduce the perceived risk").
Even if the underlying fear is irrational, addressing it could still have positive effects if
eliminating that fear would lead to better health services and advances in scientific
research. See also MICHELE SCHOONMAKER & ERIN WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
SENATOR FOR ME.

GENETIC TESTING:

SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND AND NONDISCRIMINATION

LEGISLATION

2

(2004) ("[N]ew legislation is needed to allay the fears of individuals about the poten-
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The resulting underuse of genetic technology has negative repercussions for researchers and individuals alike. 24 Scientific studies
require subjects. The lack of interest in genetic testing, therefore,
raised concerns for scientists who feared that public anxieties were
impeding their research. If people are not using genetic technology,
researchers lack test subjects. Without test subjects, researchers cannot design and run studies, and-consequently--genetic technology
cannot advance. 25 Additionally, failing to use genetic technology
could negatively impact personal health. Avoiding genetic testing
deprives patients of the health benefits of genetic science. In addition
to assessing risk or confirming a proposed diagnosis, genetic technology can improve overall care. Science is moving toward an era of
tial for discriminatory practices so that they can seek beneficial health services, participate in much-needed clinical research, and otherwise reap the benefits of the
publically funded Human Genome Project (HGP).").
24 See PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES, supranote 21, at 20-21 (testimony of Carolina Hinestrosa); Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discriminationin the
Workplace, 3J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 225, 234 (2000) ("Refusal to submit to genetic
tests due to fear of discrimination results in negative consequences both for the individuals who do not get tested and for the advancement of scientific research in this

area."); RivkaJungreis, Note, FearingFearItself: The Proposed Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005 and Public Fears About Genetic Information, 15 J.L. & POL'V 211,
244 (2007) (observing that assuaging public fear of genetic testing will benefit society
"in two spheres-that of the advancement of scientific research, and that of the individual's pursuit of optimal healthcare"); Senate PassesBill Barring Genetic Discrimination,
ISSUES Sci. & TECH., Winter 2003, at 24, 24 (quoting Sen. Bill Frist); see also Perry W.
Payne, Jr., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008: The Federal Answer for
Genetic Discrimination,5J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 33, 38 (2009) (noting that genetic
research is slowed by the fear of misuse of genetic information).
25 See ProtectingWorkers from Genetic Discrimination:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health, Emp't, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong. 31
(2007) [hereinafter Protecting Workers from Genetic Discrimination] (statement of Karen
Rothenberg, Dean, University of Maryland School of Law); see also Hearing on H.R.
493, supranote 15, at 40 (statement of Karen Pollitz, Research Professor, Georgetown
University Health Policy Institute) (describing adverse actions insurance companies
take in response to knowledge of clients' genetic test results); Regulations Under the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,912, 68,912
(Nov. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1635) ("Scientific advances require
significant cooperation and participation from members of the general public."); U.S.
PUBUC OPINION, supra note 20, at 1 (noting genetic research and clinical practice are
impeded when people opt out of genetic testing); Letter from Michael 0. Leavitt,
U.S. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., to Reed V. Tuckson, Chair, Sec'y's Advisory
Comm. on Genetics, Health, & Soc'y (Nov. 8, 2005), availableat http://oba.nih.gov/
oba/sacghs/reports/Secretary-Response-toSACGHS_-11_0805.pdf ("[TIhe public
is concerned about the potential for genetic discrimination in health insurance and
employment and.., their fears have the potential to affect their health care decisions
and their willingness to participate in genetics research.").
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"personalized medicine" in which health care professionals can use an
individual's genetic profile to tailor her medical treatment.2 6 Thus, by
failing to use genetic technology, a patient may not receive the best
care possible.
GINA's proponents cited fear of genetic-information discrimination and its negative impact on research and personal health when
arguing for the statute. 27 Moreover, Congress explained in its findings that GINA "is necessary to fully protect the public from discrimination and allay their concerns about the potential for discrimination,
thereby allowing individuals to take advantage of genetic testing, technologies, research, and new therapies." 28 Congress, therefore,
designed GINA at least in part to alleviate the anxieties surrounding
29
genetic testing and the misuse of genetic information.
Specifically, people expressed the fear that they would be judged
based on their genetic material, a concept that could be called "social
genetic determinism." Social genetic determinism expresses the anxiety that our genes will somehow determine-for better or worse-the
trajectory of our lives. 30 In popular culture, the film Gattaca 3 1-which
26 See Meredith Simons, Need Medical Treatment? Get It Your Way: Houston Researchers Lead the Way in Tailoring Therapy to Patients' DNA, CHRON.COM (Nov. 14, 2009),
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/health/6721058.html.
27 See Zach Wamp, A Look into Your Future Health?, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2004, at
A15 ("We must not allow the fear of discrimination on the basis of genetic information to impede this groundbreaking medical progress."); Sen. Gregg Pushesfor Protection
of Patientsfrom Genetic Discrimination,U.S. FED. NEWS, July 22, 2004; see also NANCY LEE
JONES & AMANDA K.SARATA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT OF 2008 (GINA), at ii (2008) (stating that Congress enacted
GINA to address fears of genetic-information discrimination, which have "an adverse
effect on those seeking genetic testing, as well as on participation in genetic
research"). The National Human Genome Research Institute, an organization that
lobbied in favor of GINA, identified the fear of genetic discrimination as a major
hurdle to genetic science and to enjoying the benefits of the Human Genome Project.
See, Nat'l Hum. Genome Research Inst., Genetic Discrimination,GENOME.GOV, http://
www.genome.gov/10002077 (last updated Nov. 26, 2010).
28 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
§ 2(5), 122 Stat. 881 (emphasis added); see also Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,912, 68,912 (Nov. 9, 2010)
(explaining that Congress intended GINA to "prohibit[ ] discrimination based on
genetic information and [to] restrict[ ] acquisition and disclosure of such information, so that the general public would not fear adverse employment- or health coverage-related consequences for having a genetic test or participating in research studies
that examine genetic information").
29 I discuss possible problems with basing legislation on fear in another article.
See Roberts, supra note 2, at 480-83.
30 Typically, "genetic determinism" stands for the proposition that genes unilaterally determine physical and behavioral traits, called phenotypes. See Richard
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commentators reference ad nauseam when discussing advances in
genetic science 32-represents a genetically deterministic world; the
perceived quality of people's DNA determines their social status, their
careers, and ultimately the courses of their lives. A genetically deterministic society, therefore, results when genetic information limits
individual choice or freedom. The anxieties surrounding geneticinformation discrimination represent at once fears about our present
and future, as well as concerns rooted in our past.
1.

Social Genetic Determinism in the Past

The fear of a genetically deterministic society is not merely based
in science fiction. It most likely stems, to some degree, from the
United States's regrettable history with eugenics-based laws and policies. Eugenics-defined in 1883 by English scientist Sir Francis
Galton as "improving the quality of the stock" 3 3-purported that certain socially undesirable characteristics, such as criminality, poverty,
and "feeblemindedness," 34 had a genetic basis and advocated the
elimination of those so-called genetic defects. 35 Starting near the
Strohman, Maneuvering in the Complex Pathfrom Genotype to Phenotype, 296 SCIENCE 701
(2002); see also Karen H. Rothenberg, Breast Cancer, the Genetic "Quick Fix," and the
Jewish Community: Ethical,Legal, and Social Challenges, 7 HEALTH MATRix 97, 103 (1997)
("[G] enetic determinism results when an individual believes her future is defined and
predicted by genetic makeup and cannot be changed."). Societies can likewise be
genetically deterministic, using genetic information to limit people's choices or their
freedom. (Thank you to Jessica Clarke for her use of the word "determinism" in
describing this sentiment as it pertains to antidiscrimination law.) Thus, under one
scenario, genes are biologically deterministic; under the other, they are socially deterministic. This Article deals exclusively with the latter, which I call "social genetic
determinism."
31 GATrACA (Columbia Pictures 1997).
32 See, e.g., Michael Tomasson, Legal, Ethical, and Conceptual Bottlenecks to the Development of Useful Genomic Tests, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 231, 239-40 (2009);Jeffery Lawrence Weeden, Genetic Liberty, Genetic Property: Protecting Genetic Information, 4 AvE
MARIA L. REV. 611, 662-63 (2006); Jeremy A. Colby, Note, An Analysis of Genetic Discrimination Legislation Proposed by the 105th Congress, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 443, 444 n.5
(1998); Marisa Anne Pagnatarro, Note, Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace:
Employee's Right to Privacy v. Employer's Need to Know, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 139, 184-85
(2001).
33 SeeJACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, DISABLED RIGHTS 36 (2003).
34 See id. at 34-38.
35 See id. Eugenics and social genetic determinism are not identical concepts.
Eugenics as an ideology has two key elements: (1) linking certain unfavorable (or
favorable) characteristics to genetics and (2) seeking to eliminate those negative
genes (or alternatively to promote those positive ones), making it arguably one of the
earliest iterations of genetic engineering. See WiLLiM F. ROWE & SANDRA SAVAGE,
SEXUALITY AND THE DEVELOPMENTALLY HANDICAPPED 6-8 (1987). Conversely, a geneti-
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beginning of the twentieth century and continuing for decades, 36
states adopted laws founded in eugenics.
Many states sanctioned forced sterilization to eliminate "unfavorable" traits.3 7 Perhaps the most famous state-ordered sterilization was
that of Carrie Buck. Buck was eighteen years old when a court
ordered the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded,
where Buck had been institutionalized, to sterilize her without her
consent. 38 Holding that states could involuntarily sterilize individuals
based on their undesirable genetics, the Supreme Court explained:
"[S] ociety can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind ....

Three generations of imbeciles are enough." 39 And

Carrie Buck was far from alone. In the years between 1921 and 1964,
states sterilized over sixty thousand people in the United States without their consent. 40 While Virginia eventually repealed its sterilization
statute41 and offered a formal-albeit posthumous-apology to Carrie
Buck, 42 the Supreme Court has never officially overturned the
43
decision.
Social Genetic Determinism in the Present and Future

2.

As tempting as it may be to dismiss Buck v. Bell4 4 as an unfortu-

nate relic of a less enlightened time, the idea that genetics correspond
to socially undesirable attributes is currently having a renaissance. For
cally deterministic society need only implicate the first half of the definition: society
may shunt people with particular genetic traits into various organizations, institutions,
occupations, or social classes based on the perceived favorability of those characteristics but would not necessarily advocate the eradication of unfavorable genes ("negative eugenics") or the promotion of favorable genes ("positive eugenics"). See LORI B.
ANDREWS ET AL., GENETICS 81 (2d ed. 2006) (distinguishing between positive and negative eugenics). Thus, all examples of eugenics involve some element of social
genetic determinism, yet all examples of social genetic determinism may not rise to
the level of eugenics.
36

See SWITZER, supra note 33, at 48-51.

37
38
39

See id. at 36.
See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
Id. at 207.

40

See SWITZER, supra note 33, at 38

41 Virginia's sterilization law was repealed in 1968. See id.
42 See Michael G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws: Providing
Redressfor the Victims of a Shameful Era in United States History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
862, 886-87, 887 nn.221-22 (2004) (citing Press Release, Governor Mark R. Warner,
Statement on the 75th Anniversary of the Buck v. Bell Decision (May 2, 2002)).
43 Although the Court did not overturn Buck, fifteen years later it held that involuntarily sterilizing individuals convicted of certain kinds of felonies violates equal protection. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942).
44 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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example, research has examined the genetic components of aberrant
behaviors such as aggression 45 and substance abuse. 46 More recently,
a study at Florida State University (FSU) made headlines by alleging a
47
Scientific
correlation between genes and gang membership.
research (however tenuous) regarding the link between genetics and
certain behaviors-criminality in particular-harkens back to many of
the ideas expressed in Buck.
Although genetically based social policies are not currently in
effect, the United States's history with eugenics, as well as developing
research and technology, made concerns regarding the possibility of
social genetic determinism strong enough for Americans to avoid
genetic testing. For example, one individual stated: "My sisters are so
afraid that if their company finds out, they might get fired.... They
don't want to be tested because of that."48 Another person expressed
concern that his employer might treat him differently as a result of his
genetic information:
Ijust was worried about being viewed differently.... I don't know if
discrimination is the right word-but it's probably the best
word....

An analogy is: women who are young and probably going

to have kids. Although they aren't discriminated against, everybody
knows: if you hire this person, you might be stuck with a huge
maternity leave bill. That influences people, even good people,
indirectly. They have reservations, want a back-up plan, and may not
give these employees all the work: "I won't give you all these
45 See Alan R. Felthous & Ernest S. Barratt, Impulsive Aggression, in AGGRESSION
123, 127 (Emil F. Coccaro ed., 2003).
46 See generally Boris Tabakoff & Paula L. Hoffman, Genetics and BiologicalMarkers
of Riskfor Alcoholism, 103 PUB. HEALTH REI'. 690 (1988) (discussing evidence that some
individuals are genetically predisposed to alcoholism).
47 See Kathleen Kingsbury, Which Kids Join Gangs? A Genetic Explanation, TIME
(June 10, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1903703,00.html.
A genetic variation that may code for the lower production of a particular enzyme
responsible for breaking down a variety of neurotransmitters could be responsible for
increased aggression. See id. This particular trait has been called the "warrior gene"
and created controversy in New Zealand when offered as an explanation for the perceived heightened violence in the Maori community. See Peter Crampton & Chris
Parkin, Warrior Genes and Risk-Taking Science, 120 N.Z. MED J., Mar. 2, 2007, at 63,
63-65, http://www.nzma.org.nz/journal/120-1250/2439 (summarizing ethical concerns associated with the supposed "warrior gene" as an explanation for Maori violence in New Zealand). In a similar logical move, the FSU study proposes that
lowered production of that same enzyme in young men may be linked to a greater
likelihood of joining gangs and using weapons. See Kingsbury, supra. According to
the study, young men with the low-active variant were twice as likely to join a gang as
men with the high-active variant. See id.
48 Klitzman, supra note 18, at 77 (alteration in original).
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projects." It would be illegal. But I'm sure a little bit of that goes
on.

49

Thus, people-even those who know they are at risk-may forgo
genetic testing, not for health reasons, but to prevent differential
treatment in other areas of their lives, such as employment. They fear
becoming the victims of a genetically deterministic society.
B. Norms Behind Protecting Genetic Information
From a practical perspective, Congress passed GINA in an
attempt to alleviate the public fears surrounding genetic testing.
However, strong normative values also underpin the desire to protect
genetic information. Exploring these values goes beyond the practical
goal of GINA-encouraging people to use genetic technology-by
providing a theoretical foundation for protecting genetic
information.
All kinds of decisionmakers could find genetic information
potentially appealing. Take, for example, a genetic variant linked to
aggression. 50 Even if that variant indicates only a slight proclivity for
aggressive behavior, one can imagine a scenario in which the most
exclusive daycare facilities or preschools would request genetic information as part of their application process to screen out potentially
aggressive children. This practice appears both logical and efficient; if
there is a way to prescreen children for a propensity for aggressionno matter how slight-it could reduce the chances of violence at a
school even before any sort of actual incident occurs. 51 One could
likewise imagine requests for genetic information dealing with aggression or impulsivity when applying for drivers' licenses or loans. (In
fact, scientists have already identified a genetic variant allegedly
49 Id. at 72-73 (alterations in original).
50 Research regarding a gene linked to aggression, as well as other potentially
negative behaviors, does in fact exist. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
51 Some scholars articulated the potential benefits of using genetic information
to differentiate between children in the classroom. See Dorothy Nelkin & Laurence
Tancredi, Classify and Control: Genetic Information in the Schools, 17 Am. J.L. & MED. 51,
69 (1991) ("Schools have long differentiated and classified students through diagnostic and evaluative tests. Detailed and sensitive information about individual children-their genetic makeup, predisposition to violence and mental illness, brain
structure and susceptibility to disease-serves well-recognized educational needs. It
also serves administrative needs, enhancing efficiency and economy in the management of education. Technologies that assess genetic capabilities and reveal biochemical states that 'cause' behavior enable educators to predict which children will be slow
learners, disruptive, handicapped or difficult in the classroom." ((footnote omitted)).
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linked to "bad driving."5 2) Even without an exact correlation, such
screening could potentially lower the risk of car accidents or loan
defaults, even if only to a very small degree. Thus, genetic information could provide a convenient, albeit crude, proxy for all kinds of
other physical and even behavioral traits. We already limit who enters
certain schools, drives, or borrows money; our genetic profiles could
just provide one more criterion to consider.
Yet while genetic information as a category is not inherently dangerous, the concern is that people might value genetic traits beyond
other potentially more useful information. With enough decisions
based on genetic information, we may eventually find ourselves in a
genetically deterministic world. For example, if preschools screen
children in the hope of creating a safer playground, it is not such a far

leap to screen job applicants according to their genetic profiles. If
given the choice, would we want to use genes to screen potential surgeons for impulsivity or potential police officers for aggression?
Once we start limiting people's educational or career options,
that practice would affect a variety of other things, including their
opportunities and their income levels. This slippery slope gets at what
lies at the core of the fears surrounding a genetically deterministic
society: creating a genetic underclass, a group of people who occupy a
subjugated social status on the basis of their genetic information
53

alone.

At least four overlapping norms undergird the fear of a genetic
underclass: (1) humanity (the belief in the intrinsic value of human
life); (2) democracy (the belief in rewarding achievement and providing equal opportunity); (3) immutability (the belief a person should
not be penalized for something outside her control); and (4) privacy
(the belief that a person should be able to keep certain kinds of intimate information private).
1. Humanity
Decisions based solely or even predominantly on genetic information hold the potential to obscure our humanity. Specifically, a genet52

See Blame Genetics for Bad Drivin& Study Finds, CNN (Oct. 29, 2009), http://

www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/science/l 0/29/bad.driver.gene/index.html?iref=

allsearch.
53 Some have argued that what frightens us is not creating a genetically determined underclass but rather explicitly recognizing that an implicit genetic underclass
already exists. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Challenges of Biology for Law, 4 TEX. REv. L.
& POL. 1, 3 (1999).
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ically deterministic society could objectify its members by reducing
54
them to mere clusters of genetic traits.
Both law and legal philosophy express a belief in the inherent
55
value of human life and the importance of respecting that value.
Objectification, a dignitary harm, results when a human being is
treated less than human as the result of a social process. 56 Social
genetic determinism objectifies individuals by reducing them to their
genetic profiles. Allocating jobs, educations, or other social goods
and privileges based on genetic traits fails to acknowledge that, while
genetic information might reveal some aspects of a person's identitysuch as elements of her appearance, her health risks, or even her talents and tendencies-it is incapable of capturing the essence of that
person in her entirety. A genetically deterministic society would,
therefore, treat individuals as clusters of genetic traits instead of as full
human beings.
2.

Democracy

Democracy is another norm that undergirds the protection of
genetic information. Used here, democracy stands for "a social state
in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege." 57 Americans have a longstanding belief in
the value of merit, defined in terms of personal achievement. 58 Merit
includes the notion that one should not be rewarded merely for her
inherent talents or her potential, but for the tangible fruits of her

54 See MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO ET AL., BIOETHICS AND LAW 741 (2d ed. 2003) ("[T] he
risks of reducing persons to objects consisting of particular characteristics that have
become salient precisely because we can exercise some control over them.").
55 See NGAiRE NAFFINE, LAW's MEANING OF LIFE 99 (2009) ("Legal doctrine and
legal philosophy are replete with assertions about the instrinsic value of human life
and the need to respect it.").
56 See SHAPIRO, supra note 54, at 10; see also Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male
Flood: Censorship,Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 15 (1985) (discussing objectification in the context of gender discrimination, and stating, "Objectification occurs when a human being, through social means, is made less than human,
turned into a thing or commodity, bought and sold").
57 4 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 443 (2d ed. 1989) (providing the modem use
of the term "democracy").
58 See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New RacialPreferences, 96 CALIF.
L. REV. 1139, 1141 (2008) (describing meritocracy as a "core American value").
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efforts. 59 Thus, a true meritocracy requires equality of opportunity, so
60
that all individuals might prove themselves deserving of social goods.
A genetically deterministic society with the resulting genetic
underclass would create the very kind of arbitrary class distinctions
that democracy, as a norm, seeks to avoid. Our genes might speak to
some of our innate abilities, but they do not determine our actual
accomplishments. 6' Thus, basing decisions on genetic information
runs counter to the central concepts behind democracy: the value of
merit and the importance of equal opportunity.
3.

Immutability

Similar to the democratic belief that individuals should be
rewarded for their personal achievements is the inverse notion that
individuals should not be penalized for traits they did not choose and
cannot change. 6 2 Although possibly not true as the science of genet59 The Oxford English Dictionary defines "meritocracy" as "government or holding
of power by people chosen on the basis of merit (as opposed to wealth, social class,
etc)." 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIONARY, supra note 57, at 635; see Norman Daniels,
Merit and Meritocracy, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 206, 207-08 (1978) (defining "meritocracy"
as: "a society whose basic institutions are governed by a partial theory of distributive
justice consisting of principles of the following types: (1) A principle ofjob placement
that awards jobs to individuals on the basis of merit; (2) A principle specifying the
conditions of opportunity under which the job placement principle is applied; (3) A
principle specifying reward schedules for jobs."). The concept of a meritocracy does
not, however, completely discount innate ability. Daniels notes that "most meritocrats
believe it is obvious that people differ in levels of skill and it is at least probable that
they differ in the capacity to acquire levels of skills." Id. at 208.
60 See Daniels, supra note 59, at 207 (describing a meritocracy as an environment
where "[a] 11social barriers. .. -social class, family background (but not the family),
race, and religion-are prevented from influencing decisions on education or
career"); id. at 217 ("Fair equality of opportunity requires not only that negative legal
or quasilegal constraints on equality of opportunity be eliminated, but also that positive steps must be taken to provide equality of access-and the means to achieve such
equality of access-to those with inferior initial competitive positions resulting from
family background or other biological or social accidents.").
61 See Bork, supra note 53, at 3 (noting we might also fear "the inability of genetic
testing to predict accurately what the individual might prove capable of
accomplishing").
62 Immutability as a concept in antidiscrimination law relies on the notion that
fairness is a matter of free will, dependent on freedom of choice and taking responsibility for those choices. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 476 & n.187 (discussing the
immutability norm's basis in the concept of free will). In fact, protecting race, sex,
national origin and-even at times-age and disability has been linked to those traits'
perceived immutability. See id. at 477 & nn.189-93 and accompanying text. Religion
is the most prominent exception to the immutability norm. See id. at 477 n.194 and

accompanying text.
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ics continues to develop, 63 genes are for the most part determined
before birth and subsequently remain more or less outside of our
immediate control.64
Because of the currently immutable nature of genes, people can
do very little to avoid being treated differently on that basis.6 5 For
63 See Ilise L. Feitshans, Spider Silk Jeans or Spider Silk Genes?: The Future of
Genetic Testing in the Workplace 20 (2000) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.
com/paper.tafabstractid=248671 ("In the next years, humanity will have the information to change many ... aspects of genetic destiny. Genes linked to color blindness, colon cancer, Huntington's disease, Down[ I Syndrome, or other conditions
that are considered to be a 'defect' today may be altered or deleted through new
treatments or cures. For others, genes bring special gifts, such as physical strength,
great intelligence, artistic ability or musical talent."). By 2020, Dr. Francis S. Collins,
former director of the National Human Genome Research Institute, speculates that
"gene-based designer drugs" will be capable of treating numerous conditions such as
Alzheimer's, diabetes, and high blood pressure. See Genetic Information in the Workplace: Hearing on S. 1332 Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 106th
Cong. 1 (2000) (testimony of Dr. Francis S. Collins, National Human Genome
Research Institute).
64 Although some gene therapy is currently available, most is somatic; doctors
insert therapeutic genes into a patient's body cells, in the hope that those cells will
then reproduce. See Kristine Barlow-Stewart, Gene Therapy, CENTRE FOR GENETICS
EDUC. (June 2007), http://www.genetics.com.au/pdf/factsheets/fs27.pdf.
65 Advocates of genetic information legislation have cited the immutable nature
of genes to justify the need to protect them. See Hearingon H.R 493, supranote 15, at
106 (statement of Frank S. Swain) ("[W~e are born with our 46 chromosomes and
30,000 genes. We cannot control or change them." (quoting Rep. Louise Slaughter)); Roberts, supra note 2, at 478 ("No American should have to worry that their
genes-which they did not choose, and over which they have no control-will be used
against them."). Individuals who felt they had suffered discrimination on the basis of
their genes have likewise cited the immutability of genetic information as evidence of
the unfairness of their treatment. See, e.g., Letter from Michelle Thompson to Whom
It May Concern (Sept. 24, 2004), reproduced in PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 21, at
65 ("I learned that not only was I a carrier for Hemophilia (which was not my fault or
choice), but that I had a 50% chance of inheriting Huntington's Disease as well (not
my fault or choice)."). Scholarly accounts also echoed this sentiment. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding for Change: The Power of the Human Genome to Transform the
American Health InsuranceSystem, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 3 (2002) ("Genetic discrimination is unfair because it penalizes people (by limiting their coverage options) not
because of their actions or choices, but because of their immutable genotype."); Eric
Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/GeneticFair/UnfairDiscriminationDilemma in Light of
the Human Genome Project, 85 Ky. L.J. 503, 563 (1997) ("Since one cannot choose one's
genetic make-up, arguably there should be no duty to pay more for insurance because
of a poor genetic make-up."); see also Colby, supra note 32, at 457 ("Genetic discrimination unfairly discriminates because of the involuntary and presently immutable
nature of our genetic endowment."). But see Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of
Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetics Legislation, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669,
712 (2001) (arguing against using immutability to justify protecting genetic informa-
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example, research like the FSU study has the potential to label people
as violent or criminal on the basis of their genetics instead of their
behavior. Thus, linking behaviors to genetics may justify treating people with the "violent" variant differently than those with the "nonviolent" variant

regardless

of actual

conduct. 66

Additionally,

an

individual may feel "locked in" to certain behaviors or life choices if
she discovers a supposed genetic proclivity for them, no matter how
small the actual correlation between the genetic variant and the
67
behavior might be.

In addition to its effect on individuals, basing decisions on immutable traits could also negatively impact social accountability. For
instance, while the FSU study does note that nurture plays an important role, 6 8 attributing an issue such as gang membership-which is
also tied to a number of social, economic, and other factors-to
genetics might obscure the role of society in both creating and remedying the problem. Politically, it may allow society to avoid accountability by blaming individual physiology for what are in fact social
problems.

69

4. Privacy
Lastly, privacy supports protecting genetic information. Violating
70
genetic privacy produces both "instrumental" and "intrinsic" harms.
On one level, the desire for genetic privacy relates to the fear of a
genetically deterministic society: if employers, health insurers, and
other potential discriminators can never access our genetic information because "[a]lthough we cannot control the genes we inherit, we cannot control a
great many other risk factors, such as in utero exposures, environmental conditions,
or drunk drivers, which may have profound effects on our future health").
66

For instance, one scientist involved in the FSU study noted that "[a]t the very

least this [research] suggests a genetic risk factor that can help us identify those youth
most at risk ....We can then intervene earlier to prevent it." Kingsbury, supra note
47.
67 See Laura F. Rothstein, Genetic Information in Schools, in GENETIC SECRETS 317,
322 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (acknowledging the potential problem of labeling

and self-fulfilling prophecy that could be associated with the use of genetic information in academics).
68 See Kingsbury, supra note 47 (noting the correlation between child abuse and
violent tendencies).
69 See Robert G.Resta, The Twisted Helix: An Essay on Genetic Counselors, Eugenics,
and Social Responsibility, 1 J. GENETIc CouNs. 227 (1992); see also SHAPIRO, supra note

54, at 883, 885-86.
70 See SHiRO, supra note 54, at 403-04 (distinguishing between instrumental
and intrinsic value of privacy).
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tion, they cannot use it to disadvantage us. 71 However, a privacy violation also constitutes its own inherent wrong, regardless of how that
information is used (or not used).
Violating privacy as a wrong unto itself relates to norms of autonomy and self-definition. Keeping certain information secret allows
individuals to control their interactions with their communities by
choosing which information to share and which information to conceal. 72 In short, privacy guards our ability to define our public identi-

ties. 73 Moreover, controlling intimate information helps us avoid
74
potential embarrassment by keeping that information private.
Our genetic profiles are just the kind of intimate information
that privacy norms seek to protect.7 5 Genetic information may reveal
all kinds of personal things: our proclivity for developing certain med78
77
ical conditions, 76 our need for sleep, or even our musical ability.
71 See Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, Privacy and Confidentiality of Genetic
Information: What Rules for the New Science?, 2 ANN. REV. GENOMICS HUM. GENETICS 401,
405 (2001). For more on the "opt-in" nature of genetic information, see infra notes
118-120. Individuals have expressed instrumental privacy concerns. For example,
one person who had undergone genetic testing explained why others avoid testing:
People are afraid of it getting on the record, so they don't get tested. The
people I know who tested were already very sick. The son of a guy in our
group is beginning to be symptomatic. The father tells him to get tested, but
he just refuses. "I don't want to know, and don't want it on my record." And
you have to reach a certain level before doctors consider [medication].
Klitzman, supra note 18, at 77. Similarly, a 2007 study indicates that while individuals
might trust their doctors and their spouses with the results of their genetic tests, they
had far less confidence when asked about sharing that information with law enforcement, health insurers, or employers. U.S. PUBLIC OPINION, supra note 20, at 2.
72 SISSELA BOK, SECRETS 20 (1983).
73 ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, at xiii (1995)
("Privacy... encompasses our right to self-determination and to define who we are.
Although we live in a world of noisy self-confession, privacy allows us to keep certain
facts to ourselves if we so choose.").
74 See David Orentlicher, Genetic Privacy in the Patient-PhysicianRelationship, in
GENETIC SECRETS, supra note 67, at 77, 78.

75 See Morrow, supra note 6, at 237-39 (noting the privacy concerns behind protecting genetic information).
76 Huntington's disease is a popular example in the literature dealing with
genetic-information discrimination because if a person has the associated genetic
trait, she has a one hundred percent chance of developing the disease (assuming she
lives long enough to reach the onset age). See Henry T. Greely, The Revolution in
Human Genetics: Implications for Human Societies, 52 S.C. L. REV. 377, 382 (2001)
("[Huntington's disease] is what geneticists call one hundred percent penetrantone hundred percent of the people with the genotype get the disease.").
77 See Laurent Seugnet et a., Identifier of a Biomarkerfor Sleep Drive in flies and
Humans, 103 PNAS 19,913, 19,913-18 (2006).
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Failing to protect the privacy of our genetic information could, there79
fore, expose personal details related to our innermost identities.
Furthermore, unlike other kinds of private information, genetic information not only divulges intimate facts about an individual person but
also about that person's entire family. 80 As a result, the intrinsic
harms associated with revealing genetic information extend beyond
the person whose privacy is initially violated.

GINA prohibits health insurers and employers from discriminating on the basis of genetic information. From a purely pragmatic
standpoint, protecting genetic information could alleviate the fears
that prevent people from taking genetic tests. Yet behind those fears
lie several normative justifications for safeguarding genetic information. Exploring these practical and theoretical reasons for protecting
genetic information helps explain why Congress drafted GINA, even
absent widespread existing genetic-information discrimination.
After examining why Congress chose to protect genetic information in the current Part, the following Part examines how Congress
protected genetic information, specifically its decision to draft GINA
as an antidiscrimination law.
II.

PROTECTING GENETIC INFORMATION

Congress could have protected genetic information in a number
of different ways. For example, it could have drafted GINA as a privacy law that allows individuals to decide when to disclose their
genetic information 8 or as a property law that confers an economic
78 See Siamak Baharloo et al., Absolute Pitch: An Approachfor Identification of Genetic
and Nongenetic Components, 62 Am. J. HUM. GENETICS 224, 229 (1998).
79 See Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 71, at 404 (asserting that there is an
intrinsic value to keeping genetic information private).
80 See Orentlicher, supra note 74, at 81 (noting that privacy is particularly important to genetic information because it reveals intimate information about one's family

members).
81 Genetic privacy laws function by requiring consent from the relevant party to
access her genetic information. In 2008, when GINA passed, several states already
protected genetic information using privacy legislation. See Genetic Privacy Laws,
NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14287

(last updated Jan. 2008).
Congress also considered privacy-based protections. In fact, early iterations of
GINA directly referenced genetic privacy, such as several proposed bills called the
"Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act" and others. E.g., H.R. 3636, 108th
Cong. (2003); H.R. 2555, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 3299, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R.

341, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 422, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1898, 104th Cong. (1996); S.
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right in one's genetic information.8 2 Instead, Congress opted to pass
1416, 104th Cong. (1995). For example, the Human Genome Privacy Act of 1991,
H.R. 2045, 102d Cong. (1991), gave individuals the right to inspect and correct any of
their genetic information maintained by government agencies and outlined the process for disclosing private genetic information. Likewise, certain versions of the
"Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act" also provided requirements for disclosing genetic information. See H.R. 341 § 4; S. 1416 § 4.
While several proposed bills included sections on disclosure, GINA contains no
such provision. Perhaps Congress ultimately rejected a privacy framework because it
would not provide adequate protection. Although people would be able to control
access to their genetic information, genetic-information consent forms could become
a standard component of applications for jobs or insurance. See Klitzman, supra note
18, at 75. Thus, people may feel compelled to disclose their genetic information as a
routine part of the application process. Alternatively, if an individual chooses not to
disclose her genetic information, potential discriminators may assume that an individual has negative genetic traits and behave accordingly.
82 Congress could also have protected genetic information using property law. At
the time of GINA's passing, five states defined genetic information as personal property, with one extending that right to DNA samples. See Genetic Privacy Laws, supra
note 81. Thus, in protecting genetic information, Congress could have established
specific property interests in genetic material under certain circumstances. A number
of scholars have suggested this approach. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy:
Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS, supra note 67, at 31, 47; Patricia
(Winnie) Roche et al., The Genetic Privacy Act: A Proposalfor National Legislation, 37
JURIMETRICSJ. 1, 4 (1996) (advocating a property right in one's DNA); Catherine M.
Valerio Barrad, Comment, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87 Nw. U. L. REv.
1037, 1040 (1993); Michael M.J. Lin, Note, Conferring a FederalProperty Right in Genetic
Material: Stepping into the Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 109,
130-32 (1996);Jonathan F. Will, Comment, DNA as Property: Implications on the Constitutionality of DNA Dragnets, 65 U. PrrT. L. REv. 129, 139-41 (2003). Unlike the extensive consideration of privacy protections, only one of the many proposed bills
dedicated to genetic information included a personal property right. See Genetic
Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act, S. 1898, 104th Cong. § 105(2) (1996) ("A
DNA sample is the property of the individual.").
Property law is in many ways an intuitive choice for protecting our genetic identities, given the commodification of genetic material. Federal law permits researchers
to patent genetic information, including isolated genes and gene fragments. See
Sonia M. Suter, DisentanglingPrivacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understandingof
Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 745-46 nn.28-31 (2004). However, significant drawbacks also exist. For example, with respect to research, scientists rely on
large numbers of samples to draw conclusions about genetic information. Personal
property interests in genetic material could, therefore, potentially stymie science if all
donors needed to consent to each activity conducted with their genetic material.
Additionally, property law confers a purely economic right, which fails to acknowledge the dignitary concerns underlying the protection of genetic information. See
Suter, supra, at 746-47 ("[In a property law model,] genetic information is seen as a
commodity, disaggregated from the self, rather than something in which we have a
dignitary and personhood interest. In addition, even when the property model successfully protects some of the interests we have in our genetic information, the prop-
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GINA as an antidiscrimination statute dedicated solely to outlawing
genetic-information discrimination in health insurance and employment. This choice shapes both the rights plaintiffs exercise with
respect to their genetic information, as well as what constitutes an
actionable claim.
A.

GINA as an AntidiscriminationStatute

Antidiscrimination law offers a particular kind of protection. As
an antidiscrimination statute, GINA creates negative restraints on the
information that covered entities can consider when making certain
relevant decisions.8 3 An antidiscrimination model differs significantly
from both privacy and property paradigms. Unlike privacy, antidiscrimination protections do not require positive conduct on the part of
health insurers and employers, such as disclosure agreements. 84 Furthermore, unlike property, GINA confers no positive rights in our
genetic information. GINA does not give us control in deciding when
and how our genetic information might be used; it only speaks to conditions under which particular parties cannot use our genetic
information.
GINA's supporters explicitly characterized the law as civil rights
legislation, often arguing that discrimination on the basis of genetic
information is akin to discrimination on the basis of other traditionally protected traits such as race and sex.8 5 Congress likewise portrayed GINA as a statute conceived in the American civil rights
tradition by linking genetic-information discrimination to the forced
sterilization of people with disabilities8 6 and racially targeted screenerty model undermines the relationships in which we share this information, pushing
them toward arms-length transactions as opposed to relationships of trust.").
83 See Dawn C. Nunziato, Note, GenderEquality: States as Laboratories,80 VA. L. REv.
945, 946 (1994) (defining the antidiscrimination principle as "one of negative
restraint that forbids the government from arbitrarily discriminating against classes of
individuals").
84 GINA's exceptions may in practice require disclosure agreements. However,
those disclosure agreements are not the primary tool by which GINA functions.
85 For example, Senator Ted Kennedy called GINA "the first major... civil rights
bill of the new century" and asserted that "discrimination based on a person's genetic
identity is just as unacceptable as discrimination on the basis of race or religion." U.S.
Blocks Genetic Discrimination,BBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2008), http://www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/7366264.stm. Similarly, President George W. Bush stated that "[j]ust as we
have addressed discrimination based on race, gender and age, we must now prevent
discrimination based on genetic information." David E. Sanger, Bush Supports Federal
Law Putting Limits on DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 2001, at 10.
86 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
§ 2(2), 122 Stat. 881, 882 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (Supp. II 2008)) ("The early
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ings for sickle cell anemia.8 7 Although GINA's insurance provisions
function like a health care statute such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the spirit of the law is undoubt88
edly one of antidiscrimination.
However, cabining genetic information as a functional antidiscrimination classification presented Congress with a serious challenge. 89 Arguments have been made for the genetic basis of a variety
of attributes 9° including alcoholism9 1 obesity, 9 2 and-as menscience of genetics became the basis of State laws that provided for the sterilization of
persons having presumed genetic 'defects' such as mental retardation, mental disease, epilepsy, blindness, and hearing loss, among other conditions. The first sterilization law was enacted in the State of Indiana in 1907. By 1981, a majority of States
adopted sterilization laws to 'correct' apparent genetic traits or tendencies. Many of
these State laws have since been repealed, and many have been modified to include
essential constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection. However,
the current explosion in the science of genetics, and the history of sterilization laws by
the States based on early genetic science, compels Congressional action in this
area.").
87 See id. § 2(3) ("Although genes are facially neutral markers, many genetic conditions and disorders are associated with particular racial and ethnic groups and gender. Because some genetic traits are most prevalent in particular groups, members of
a particular group may be stigmatized or discriminated against as a result of that
genetic information. This form of discrimination was evident in the 1970s, which saw
the advent of programs to screen and identify carriers of sickle cell anemia, a disease
which afflicts African-Americans. Once again, State legislatures began to enact discriminatory laws in the area, and in the early 1970s began mandating genetic screening of all African Americans for sickle cell anemia, leading to discrimination and
unnecessary fear. To alleviate some of this stigma, Congress in 1972 passed the
National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act, which withholds Federal funding from
States unless sickle cell testing is voluntary.").
88 Title I bars the use of genetic information by health insurers in determining
eligibility or premiums. Although both titles of GINA protect against discrimination
on the basis of genetic information, Titles I and II approach the issue differently.
Title II constitutes its own stand-alone section of the United States Code, whereas
Title I-like HIPAA-amends sections of various significant federal health insurance
legislation.
89 See Mark A. Rothstein, Why Treating Genetic Information SeparatelyIs a Bad Idea, 4
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 33, 33 (1999) (noting that creating a "working definition" of
genetic information is next to impossible, as any definition will be at once over- and
underinclusive); see also Morrow, supra note 6, at 239-45 (discussing the problems
associated with establishing genetic information as a distinct category).
90 Other behaviors that may have genetic bases include: the need for sleep, see
Mark Henderson, Genetic Mutation May Be Why Some People Need Less Sleep than Others,
TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 14, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/lifeandstyle/
health/article6795361.ece; the predisposition for anger, see Felthous & Barratt, supra
note 45, at 127; and the ability to recognize pitch, seeJen Waters, Genes May Play a Solo
in Pitch Recognition, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at B01.
91 See, e.g., Tabakoff & Hoffman, supra note 46, at 690-91.
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tioned-gang membership.9 3 Moreover, because genetic information
determines many key aspects of our bodies' physical morphologies, it
invariably overlaps with the existing antidiscrimination categories of
sex, age, and disability. Congress explicitly sought to define "genetic
information" as distinct from those other traits by excluding sex, age,
94
and manifested health conditions from GINA's coverage.
Congress used two key terms to define genetic information as a
stand-alone, antidiscrimination category: "genetic information" and
"genetic testing." Both titles of GINA define "genetic information" as
"(i) such individual's genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family members of such individual, and (iii) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such individual." 95 Likewise, both titles
contain the same definition of "genetic test": "an analysis of human
DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites that detects
96
genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes."

92 See, e.g., Anthony G. Comuzzie & David B. Allison, The Search for Human Obesity
Genes, 280 SCIENCE 1374, 1374-76 (1998).
93 See Kingsbury, supra note 47.
94 Congress explicitly differentiated genetic information from existing antidiscrimination categories. For example, although sex is a genetically determined trait,
GINA excludes sex from the definition of "genetic information." See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, §§ 101(d), 102 (a) (1) (B),
103(d), 104(b), 201(4) (C), 122 Star. 881, 884, 888, 897, 900, 906 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). GINA also excludes age from its definition of
"genetic information." See id. § 201(4) (c). GINA distinguishes between genetically
based health conditions and their associated genes. See id. § 101(d) (excluding the
"analysis of proteins or metabolites that does not detect genotypes, mutations, or
chromosomal changes," or "an analysis of proteins or metabolites that is directly
related to a manifested disease, disorder, or pathological condition that could reasonably be detected by a health care professional with appropriate training and expertise
in the field of medicine involved" from the definition of "genetic test" in Title I); id.
§ 210 (excluding "the use, acquisition, or disclosure of medical information that is
not genetic information about a manifested disease, disorder, or pathological condition," even if such "has or may have a genetic basis" from the definition of "genetic
information" in Title II).
95 See id. §§ 101(d), 102(a) (1) (B), 103(d), 104(b), 201(4) (A) (i)-(iii). The definition of genetic information also includes requesting or receiving genetic services,
such as participating in clinical research, by an individual or by members of her family. See id.§§ 101(d), 102(a)(1)(B), 103(d), 104(b), 201(4)(B).
96 See id.§§ 101(d), 102(a)(1)(B), 103(a)(2), 104(b), 201(7). In other contexts,
"genetic test" has been defined more broadly. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 54, at 745
("The earliest forms of genetic diagnosis, still frequently practiced, were based on
observation of an individual's clinical findings or constellation of anomalies and on
assessment of the family history.").
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Importantly, both of GINA's two substantive titles forbid simply
acquiring genetic information. 9 7 Insurers cannot request or require
genetic testing.9 8 Likewise, employers cannot acquire genetic information through requesting, requiring, or purchasing.9 9 Prohibiting
the mere obtaining of genetic information respects genetic privacy: to
violate GINA, employers or insurers do not need to use the genetic
information they acquire-they must only obtain or attempt to obtain
it. Because GINA allows no consideration of genetic information, the
statute takes what has been described as a "genome-blind" approach
to protecting genetic information.' 0 0 GINA thus attempts to level the
playing field between the health insurer or the employer and the individual by restricting the covered entities' ability to use genetic information. 10 1 As a result, one can read GINA as simultaneously reducing
the bargaining power of the covered entity and reducing the vulnera10 2
bility of potential insureds and employees.
While GINA prohibits a very specific form of genetic-information
discrimination, Congress alluded to a different kind of genetically
based discrimination-eugenics-in its official findings, mentioning
sterilization laws like those in Buck to justify the need for legislation. 10 3 Interestingly, GINA would have no effect on Carrie Buck were
her case to happen today. The statute protects only against discrimination on the basis of genetic information in health insurance and
employment. It says nothing with regard to whether a state may make
decisions about a person's health, reproductive rights, or bodily integrity based on her genetic information. Unfortunately, with current
97 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 101(b) (amending
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)); id. § 102(a) (amending Public
Health Service Act (PHSA)); id. § 103(b) (amending Internal Revenue Code (IRC));
id. § 104(a) (amending Social Security Act (SSA)) (adding provisions stating that

insurers "shall not request or require an individual or a family member of such individual to undergo a genetic test"); id. § 202(b) (providing that an employer may not
.request, require, or purchase genetic information with respect to an employee or a
family member of the employee").
98 See supra note 97.
99 See supra note 97. Notably, § 202(b) includes six exceptions. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act §§ 202(b)(1)-(b)(6). The other sections of Tite II have
similar prohibitions. See id. §§ 203(b), § 204(b), 205(b).
100 See Mark A. Rothstein, Legal Conceptions of Equality in the Genomic Age, 25 LAw &
INEQ. 429, 456 (2007) (describing genetic nondiscrimination and genetic privacy laws
as "genome-blind").
101 I am indebted to Samuel Bray's work on "power rules" for this reading of
GINA. SeeSamuel Bray, PowerRules, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1172, 1181 (2010) (describ-

ing Title I of GINA as a "power-decreasing rule").
102 Id.
103 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 2(2).
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scientific research linking genetics to socially undesirable behaviors
and tendencies, decisionmakers other than health insurers and
employers may be interested in obtaining genetic information.
B.

What Makes GINA Different

Genetic information is unique as an antidiscrimination category.
In advocating for the law, GINA's supporters often compared genetic
information to traditional antidiscrimination categories like race and
sex. 0 4 However, while genetic information may masquerade as an
analogue to more conventional legally protected traits, it differs in key
ways.
For example, prior to GINA, characteristics receiving antidiscrimination protection constituted socially recognized groups with
associated identities and the potential to become objects of stigma. By
contrast, genetic information-at least at present-does not comprise
a lived social category in the same way as race, sex, or disability. While
much has been written on the subjects of racial identity, 10 5 gender
104 The inheritability and perceived immutability of genetic information provided
a popular point of comparison. "People do not get to choose their own genes, nor
can they change the genes they have been given. This is a civil rights issue as much as
are race and gender discrimination. To base judgment on that which is inherited and
immutable is simply wrong." Monique K. Mansoura & Frances S. Collins, Medical
Implications of the Genetic Revolution, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 329, 351 (1998); see
also Protecting Workers from Genetic Discrimination, supra note 25, at 42 ("The reasons for
making genetic privacy part of our broader discrimination protections were clear to
us. First, we believe that a person's genetic profile should be treated the same as
other innate human characteristics such as one's race, gender, national origin, sexual
orientation, age or physical abilities. Simply stated, a person's genetic profile is as
natural and as inseparable from who they are as any other physical trait or attribute."
(statement of Harriet Pearson, Chief Privacy Officer, IBM Corp.)); Christine Formas
Norris, Note, The Genetic Information NondiscriminationAct of 2008: History, Successes,
and Future Considerations, 7 U. Mo. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 192, 195
(2007) ("[O]ur genetic profiles are immutable characteristics, because much like race
and gender, our genes are inherited and unalterable.").
105 See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A HairPiece: Perspectiveson the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365, 371-72 ("Racism and sexism are interlocking, mutually-reinforcing components of a system of dominance rooted in patriarchy."); Devon
W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 COiNELL L. REv. 1259, 1262 (2000)
(exploring how outsider groups, such as women and minorities, "are often likely to
perceive themselves as subject to negative stereotypes . . . [and] feel the need to do
significant amounts of 'extra' identity work to counter those stereotypes"); Camille
Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discriminationby Proxy and the Future of
Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1134, 1159 (2004) (arguing that courts should "abandon
the current definitions of race and ethnicity under Title VII that exempt from protection 'voluntary' aspects of racial and ethnic identities").
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identity, 10 6 and disability identity, 10 7 genetic identity still remains
largely a mystery. Because genetic science is still in its infancy, genetic
information is too young as a social category to have developed a recl0 8
ognized identity group or stigma based on group membership.
Furthermore, acquiring genetic information requires testing, 10 9
whereas other groups tend to rely on social and cultural signals and
morphological traits as indicators of group membership. 110 Even if
people were actively seeking genetic testing, the parameters of our
genetic identities would still be unclear by virtue of the fact that science is currently unable to decipher the exact meaning of much of
that information.1 1 1 At present, we can only speculate about the type
and number of identity groups that might arise with respect to genetic
I 12
information or who will be considered a member.
106 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 2541, 2544-45
(1994) (arguing that community norms are too discriminatory "to provide a satisfactory benchmark for defining workplace equality"); Ann C. McGinley, CreatingMasculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment"Because of Sex, "79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151 (2008)
(discussing "gender norms" in the context of workplace harassment); Janie Allison
Sitton, Introduction, 7 Wm.& MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 1, 3 (2000) (concluding that gender
is fixed in the workplace, and "that harassing behavior at work is often rooted in
perceptions of gender difference").
107 See, e.g., Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REv. 1043
(2004) (noting that modem disability theory is moving towards the view of disability
as a socially constructed condition); Michael Ashley Stein, Foreword:Disability and Identity, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 907 (2003) (discussing perceptions of disability).
108 See Diver & Cohen, supra note 16, at 1476-77. Stigma is the notion that a
particular characteristic is "deeply discrediting" within a particular social context.
ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA 3 (1986). It is an important aspect in the creation and
maintenance of group subjugation that the antisubordination principle aims to eradicate. With no recognized social group and no widely recognized history of discrimination, stigma has not yet attached to genetic information as a category. That is not
to say, however, that there is no stigma attached to certain genetically based health
conditions. See Klitzman, supra note 18, at 81 (describing the potential stigma associated with Huntington's).
109 See infra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
110 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713,
728-29 (1985) (discussing the means by which membership in a minority group is
perceived).
111 See Diver & Cohen, supra note 16; supra note 16 and accompanying text.
112 Some researchers are currently exploring the formation of genetic identity
amongst individuals at risk for certain genetic conditions. See Robert Klitzman, "Am I
My Genes?". Questions of Identity Among Individuals Confronting Genetic Disease, 11
GENETIC MED. 880 (2009). However, the concept of genetic identity remains a relatively new phenomenon and not yet widely recognized by society at large.
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Additionally, there is only a limited history of genetic disadvantage. 113 Previous statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964114 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990115 were retrospective, looking to existing discrimination to justify protecting
against future harm. 11 6 Yet instead of reacting to current discrimination like its predecessors, GINA is a forward-looking statute-designed
to preempt a variety of discrimination before it becomes
entrenched.1 17 However, the absence of current discrimination could
be a function of the unique nature of genetic information.
Much genetic difference is not readily identifiable-even for
potential claimants. Unlike other bases for discrimination, geneticinformation discrimination often requires medical testing and professional expertise.11 8 In many circumstances, 19 an insurer or an
employer could not discriminate-nor could an individual know that
she warrants protection-but for the intervention of medical science.
Therefore, current rates of genetic-information discrimination could
be low because people refuse genetic testing to avoid becoming the
120
objects of discrimination.
113 See Roberts, supra note 2, at 457-71.
114 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006)).
115 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (2006)).
116 See Roberts, supra note 2, at 457-70
117 See generally id. (arguing that GINA is the first preemptive antidiscrimination
statute in American history); see also Rothenberg & Terry, supra note 19, at 197 (arguing in favor of enacting federal legislation before genetic-information discrimination
takes hold); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1163
(1988) (characterizing the Due Process Clause as backward-looking and the Equal
Protection Clause as forward-looking).
118 See Norris, supra note 104, at 198 ("Unlike race, ethnicity, religion, or gender,
genetic predispositions are not readily apparent without laboratory genetic testing,
physical medical examinations, or the disclosure of family medical histories."); see also
Diver & Cohen, supranote 16, at 1445 ("One obviously cannot base discrimination on
a person's genetic profile unless one has first obtained information about that profile."); David F. Partlett, Misuse of Genetic Information: The Common Law andProfessionals'
Liability, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 489, 490-91 (2003) (noting medical science's increasing
ability to perform genetic testing).
119 Family history is the notable exception here, as it is a type of genetic information that does not always require genetic testing. For example, a parent's developing
cancer might indicate a child's genetic proclivity for developing cancer, even though
neither party ever had a genetic test.
120 See Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigmfor Preventing
Genetic Discrimination,55 VANn. L. Rav. 1341, 1351 (2002) ("The first obvious line of
defense is to evade genetic testing. If people adopt this strategy, as they are likely to
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The lack of a widely recognized social identity group, the low rate
of existing discrimination, and the role of testing make protecting
genetic information patently different from protecting other antidiscrimination categories. Despite these significant differences, GINA
can be understood in terms of antidiscrimination theory.
III.

THEORIZING GENETIC INFORMATION

Although genetic information differs from traditional antidiscrimination categories in certain fundamental ways, GINA is undoubtedly an antidiscrimination statute. However, to date, virtually no
scholars have devoted significant attention to how antidiscrimination
theory informs or effectuates GINA's purpose. Building on the conclusion that GINA is an antidiscrimination statute, this Part argues
that understanding GINA in terms of existing antidiscrimination principles could improve its protections.
A.

TraditionalAntidiscriminationPrinciples

For decades scholars have debated what should be at the heart of
the American antidiscrimination project: a principle based on ending
group subordination or a principle based on prohibiting any classification on the basis of certain forbidden traits.' 21 Thus, the antidiscrimination principle 22 is often described in terms of two sometimes
do, they will impede the realization of genomics' contributions to both personal welfare and social good."); see also Kim, supra note 6, at 698 (stating that, with regard to
genetic information, "unlike race or sex, the traits that would be the basis for discrimination are not readily detected through casual observation, and systematic discrimination cannot occur unless information about genetic characteristics becomes widely
available").
121 See generalyJack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003) (providing
detailed history of the development and application of two distinct antidiscrimination
trends in American jurisprudence); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordinationand
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1470
(2004) (contextualizing the development of competing theories on equal protection
law).
122 When used here, "antidiscrimination principle" does not exclusively refer to
anticlassification or antidifferentiation norms as is sometimes true in the literature.
See, e.g., Paul Brest, In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,90 HARv. L. REV. 1, 1
(1976); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
108 (1976); Robert Post, PreudicialAppearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,92 MicH.
L. REV. 2410, 2440-41 (1994). Instead, the term is all-encompassing, referring to the
goals undergirding antidiscrimination law. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 121, at 10
("In hindsight, [Fiss's] choice of words was quite unfortunate, because there is no
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competing, sometimes complementary, interpretations: antisubordination and anticlassification.
These two versions of the antidiscrimination principle employ
differing accounts of the meaning of equality. The antisubordination
principle1 2 3 roughly holds that covered entities should not act in
124
a way that reinforces the social status of subjugated groups.

particular reason to think that antidiscrimination law or the principle of antidiscrimination is primarily concerned with classification or differentiation as opposed to
subordination and the denial of equal citizenship. Both antisubordination and
anticlassification might be understood as possible ways of fleshing out the meaning of
the antidiscrimination principle, and thus as candidates for the 'true' principle
underlying antidiscrimination law.").
123 The antisubordination principle has been the subject of numerous interpretations and alternate nomenclatures. For example, Owen Fiss's original incarnation of
the antisubordination principle was named the "group-disadvantaging principle,"
which he defined as requiring that laws not aggravate or perpetuate "the subordinate
status of a specially disadvantaged group." Fiss, supra note 122, at 157. Other variants
include the "antisubjugation" principle, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1515 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing in favor of an "antisubjugation principle,
which aims to break down legally created or legally reinforced systems of subordination that treat some people as second-class citizens"), the "equal citizenship" principle, see Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L.
Riv. 1, 46 (1977) (stating that "[t]he central concern of the equal citizenship principle is equality of personal status in the society"), and the "antidomination" principle,
see Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 39
(Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (asserting that Catharine A.
MacKinnon's work advocates "[t]he reconceptualization of equality as
antidomination").
Cass Sunstein has developed a related concept, the "anticaste" principle. See Sunstein, supra note 122, at 2413 (noting similarities to theories advanced by Tribe and
Fiss but arguing that the anticaste principle differs in its account of equality and its
application to legislative--opposed to judicial--enforcement). As defined by Sunstein, the anticaste principle has two requirements: the defining trait must be (1)
visible and (2) morally irrelevant. Id. at 2411-12. Genetic information-as was discussed-is neither highly visible, as it requires voluntary medical testing to be
revealed, nor morally irrelevant, as it can result in eventual physical and functionalas well as social-disadvantage. Thus, because of these prerequisites, members of a
genetic underclass may never be the beneficiaries of this particular version of the
antisubordination principle.
124 SeeSiegel, supra note 121, at 1472-73 (explaining the antisubordination principle as "the conviction that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce
the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups"). Additionally, the anticaste
principle differs slightly from other interpretations of the antisubordination principle
in that it relies on actual numerical disparities in certain tangible social goods like
education, employment, and income, not simply historical disadvantage or subordinated social status. See Sunstein, supra note 122, at 2443-44. For example, a group
may be disadvantaged and experience social subordination in the sense that it is an
object of discrimination but-because its social welfare status is elevated or compara-
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Antisubordination would, therefore, permit affirmative action
designed to improve the status of a disadvantaged group and forbid
facially neutral policies that perpetuate lowered group status, even
absent the intent to discriminate. Its complement, the anticlassification principle,1 2 5 maintains that covered entities should not consider
certain classes of forbidden traits under any circumstance, 126 adopting
a formal equal treatment model of equality. 12 7 Thus, the
antisubordination principle expresses a commitment to protect subjugated groups from status harms (whether explicit or unintended),
while the anticlassification principle demonstrates a commitment to
ble to that of out-group members-not be considered members of a lower caste. See
id. Such a group could potentially benefit from an antisubordination regime but not
an anticaste one.
125 The anticlassification principle is also known as the "antidiscrimination" principle, see supra note 122; see also Paul Brest, supra note 122, at 1 (defining the antidiscrimination principle as "the general principle disfavoring classifications and other
decisions and practices that depend on the race (or ethnic origin) [or other forbidden traits] of the parties affected"), or the "antidifferentiation" principle, see Sunstein, supra note 122, at 2439-40 (asserting that "[t]he anticaste principle was
transformed into an antidifferentiation principle," shifting the focus from "the elimination of second-class citizenship" to "whether people who were similarly situated had
been treated similarly").
126 See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 121, at 10 (defining the anticlassification principle as the idea that "the government may not classify people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category: for example, their race").
127 Conversely, antisubordination may embrace the functional equal treatment,
equal outcome, and equal access-as well as formal equal treatment-models of
equality. I borrow these four particular conceptualizations of equality from Susan
Sturm. See Susan Sturm, Equality and Inequality: Legal Aspects, in INTERNATIONAL ENcYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCEs 4717, 4717-22 (2001). Formal equal
treatment forbids explicit and intended differential treatment. Functional equal
treatment attempts to account for inequality that is the result of intended, as well as
unintended, bias. Equal outcome examines material differences based on group
membership, such as differences in income and education level. Equal access targets
structural inequalities that create differential treatment in formally equal policies. As
an example, take an employer's policy on tardiness and its effect on sex discrimination. Under a formal equal treatment model, the lateness policy would be unequal
only if it contains explicit provisions treating men and women differently on the basis
of sex. Under a functional equal treatment model, even if the policy is neutral on its
face, if the employer enforces it differently because supervisors assume that women
tend to be late more often than men because of a belief that women are frequently
responsible for taking their children to school, the policy would not be equal. Under
an equal outcome model, if women tend to be promoted less frequently than men as
a result of the lateness policy, it would be unequal. Finally, if the employer's assumption was correct and women are more likely to be responsible for taking their children to school, under equal access, the employer might need to make some kind of
accommodation so as not to disadvantage its female workers.
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protect individuals from all forms of differential treatment based on a
proscribed trait (including so-called benign or reverse discrimination). 128 Whereas antisubordination emphasizes group membership,
anticlassification advances an individualized account of equality.1 29
That said, anticlassification as an antidiscrimination principle
cannot stand alone: while maintaining that decisions cannot be made
against individuals on the basis of certain forbidden traits, it does
nothing to explain why those particular traits are forbidden. The
anticlassification principle can thereby be understood as an empty vessel that other normative values must "fill" by dictating which traits to
forbid. Although the concepts are sometimes treated as competing,
antisubordination could-and in fact often does-drive anticlassification-based laws. 130 In their work on the legacy of Brown v. Board of
Education,Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel propose that antisubordination
values have been, at times, indispensible to the practical application of
the anticlassification principle.1 3 1 Thus, while at times portrayed as a
simple dichotomy, the connection between anticlassification and

128 Siegel explains the two models in terms of group versus individualized
accounts of equality. Siegel, supra note 121, at 1472-73 ("For many, the belief that
anticlassification commitments are fundamental entails the view that our tradition
embraces a particular conception of equality, one that is committed to individuals
rather than to groups.... The fundamentality of the anticlassification principle thus
explains various features of our equal protection tradition, foremost among them its
commitment to protect individuals against all forms of racial classification, including
'benign' or 'reverse' discrimination.").
129 Justice Thomas articulated the Court's preference for an individual-oriented
account of equality over a group-oriented one in its interpretation of Equal
Protection:
At the heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the
principle that the government must treat citizens as individuals, and not as
members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups. It is for this reason that we
must subject all racial classifications to the strictest of scrutiny, which (aside
from two decisions rendered in the midst of wartime) has proven automatically fatal.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
130 See Siegel, supra note 121, at 1477; see also Balkin & Siegel, supra note 121, at 13
("[A] ntisubordination values have played and continue to play a key role in shaping
what the anticlassification principle means in practice."). Antisubordination is not,
however, the only underlying norm that may motivate anticlassification protection.
131 See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 121, at 28 ("[A]pplication of the anticlassification principle often depends on judgments concerning the presence, absence, or
degree of status-harm-the very sorts of judgments with which the antisubordination
principle is concerned.").
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For instance,

an

antisubordination statute might protect certain racial groups because
those particular groups experience discrimination on the basis of
group membership. On the other hand, an anticlassification statute
would forbid the use of race in making any decision-positive or negative-regardless of whether particular individuals have faced discrimination on the basis of race. However, the very selection of "race" as a
forbidden trait may reflect a desire to address the sort of status concerns that are more readily associated with antisubordination. Hence,
anticlassification may seek to prevent subordination, albeit not as
explicitly.
B.

AntidiscriminationPrinciples and Genetic Information

Protecting genetic information can be understood in either
antisubordination or anticlassification terms. An antisubordinationbased law would seek to prevent the formation of a genetic underclass. 13 3 Alternatively, an anticlassification-based statute would prohibit any decision-positive, negative, or value-neutral-about
individuals based on their genetic information. While either variant
of the antidiscrimination principle could have formed the normative
foundation for GINA, the statute's protections align predominantly

with anticlassification.
1. Antisubordination and Genetic Information
Traditionally, the antisubordination principle asserts that decisionmakers should not act in a way that reinforces the lowered social
status of a historically disadvantaged group.1 34 Thus, GINA could not
be an antisubordination statute in the traditional sense, as there is no
currently disadvantaged, widely recognized social group associated
with genetic-information discrimination. However, Congress could
have drafted GINA as an antisubordination statute-even absent an
132 Both antisubordination and anticlassification prohibit intentional discrimination that could lead to subjugated group status. However, antisubordination also prohibits facially neutral policies that could lead to subjugated status, while
anticlassification does not. Additionally, anticlassification prohibits intentional discrimination that does not have an adverse impact, such as affirmative action.
133 Because genetic-information discrimination is not occurring on a widespread
basis and no group has yet been identified as genetically disadvantaged, the
antisubordination principle as applied to genetic information could only prevent the
creation of a subordinated class rather than eliminate existing subjugation.
134 See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
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existing genetic underclass 135-by seeking to preempt the formation
of a genetically disadvantaged social group. Subordination occurs
36
when one attribute becomes widely valued over another attribute.1
If society begins to favor particular genes or genetic profiles, we risk
creating a group who is disadvantaged purely on the basis of genetic
information. Antisubordination protections for genetic information
would, therefore, anticipate possible status harms and seek to prevent
them.
Because genetic disadvantage is so pervasive-we are all predisposed to between five and fifty serious genetic conditions-we are all
potential members of a genetic underclass. 13 7 As a result, who will
comprise a genetically disadvantaged group depends less on actual
genetic material and more on which tests are developed and used. 138
Moreover, since we all have multiple genetic flaws, individual people
could be members of more than one genetically disadvantaged group,
depending on which tests are developed and which conditions related
to those tests become stigmatized.
While we may be unable to predict exactly who might form a
genetic underclass, we know enough about social subjugation in other
contexts to take preventative measures. Stigma forms in four distinct,
predictable phases: labeling difference, linking difference to undesirable traits, categorizing people by label, and status loss and discrimina135 See Sunstein, supra note 122, at 2433 ("[A] history of discrimination is not a
necessary condition for status as a lower caste, though in practice such a history is
highly probable.").
136 See Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REv. Soc.
363, 367-75 (2001) (arguing that stigma forms in four stages: (1) distinguishing and
labeling personal differences, (2) creating stereotypes by linking certain labeled people to undesirable traits, (3) placing labeled people into distinct categories, and (4)
causing labeled people to experience status loss and discrimination based on their
label). Moreover, animus or an intent to discriminate need not be present. Status
hierarchies may result when small preferences accrue over time to result in subjugation. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. R~v. 458, 469 (2001) ("[B]ehavior that appears gender neutral, when considered in isolation, may actually produce gender bias when connected
to broader exclusionary patterns.").
137 See Louise McIntosh Slaughter, Genetic Testing and Discrimination:How PrivateIs
Your Information?, 17 STAN. L. & POL'y Ruv. 67, 69 (2006) ("No human being has a
perfect set of genes. In fact, every one of us is estimated to be genetically predisposed
to between five and fifty serious disorders. Every person is therefore a potential victim
of genetic discrimination.").
138 See Alexander Morgan Capron, Which Ills to Bear?: Reevaluating the "Threat" of
Modern Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 665, 690 (1990) (noting that while all people have
potentially fatal genes, those who carry the genes for which genetic screens are first
developed will suffer disproportionately).
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tion based on labeling.1 3 9 Consequently, steps could be taken to
counteract that process. For example, antisubordination policies,
such as diversity initiatives, have been proposed for other antidiscrimination categories with respect to work and education.' 40 Likewise, an antisubordination approach to genetic information might
emphasize genetic diversity1 41 to prevent negative stereotypes based
on genetic difference from forming. Thus, antisubordination would
draw lessons from the past to target practices that could lead to subordinated social status. Additionally, like antisubordination protections
for race, sex, and disability, an antisubordination approach to genetic
information would likewise allow positive differential treatment and
disparate impact claims.
2.

Anticlassification and Genetic Information

An anticlassification approach, on the other hand, would prohibit entities from ever considering genetic information. Because
GINA bans all intentional, differential treatment on the basis of
genetic information, the statute is more in keeping with the anticlassification norm.
GINA comprehensively prohibits health insurers and employers
from considering genetic information. While GINA prohibits the
adverse use of genetic information in employment,1 42 it also proscribes
classifying on the basis of genetic information.' 4 3 As a result, employ139 See Link & Phelan, supra note 136, at 367-75.
140 See Kate McCormick, The Evolution of Workplace Diversity, Hous. LAW., Mar.-Apr.
2007, at 10 (discussing diversity initiatives and the meaning of "diversity").
141 See Bruce T. Lahn & Lanny Ebenstein, Let's Celebrate Human Genetic Diversity,
461 NATURE 726, 727 (2009) (arguing that we should value genetic diversity along
with cultural diversity).
142 Section 202(a) (1) of GINA provides that an employer cannot "fail or refuse to
hire, or to discharge, any employee, or otherwise to discriminate against any
employee with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment of the employee, because of genetic information with respect to the
employee." 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-I (a) (1) (Supp. II 2008). While this provision has an
antisubordination tone, it forbids only intentional negative use of genetic information. Thus, § 202(a) (1) does not encompass certain fundamental elements traditionally associated with the antisubordination principle-affirmative action and disparate
impact. Id.
143 Tide II prohibits classification on the basis of genetic information. See id.
§ 2000ff-i (a) (2) (providing that employers may not "limit, segregate, or classify the
employees of the employer in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive any
employee of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the status of the
employee as an employee, because of genetic information with respect to the
employee"); id. § 2000ff-2(a)(2) (similarly regulating employment agencies); id.
§ 2000ff-3 (a) (2) (similarly regulating labor organizations); id. § 2000ff-4 (a) (2) (simi-
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ers cannot treat employees differently-either positively or negatively-based on their genetic information. Similarly, health insurers
cannot use genetic information when determining eligibility, premiums, or benefits. 144 GINA prevents any adjustment to an insurance
premium based on genetic information. Thus, by outlawing positive,
as well as negative, differential treatment, GINA takes a formal equal
treatment approach to protecting genetic information. Further,
GINA offers an individualized account of equality. Because all people
are potential beneficiaries, the statute is geared more toward protecting individual traits than averting group harm.
Additionally, GINA only outlaws intentional discrimination.
Other antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII, allow claimants to
challenge facially neutral policies that create discriminatory results,
absent an intent to discriminate. 145 This type of claim is commonly
referred to as a "disparate impact" action. 146 In keeping with
antisubordination values, Title VII's disparate impact jurisprudence is
one-sided: it applies only to legal actions brought by members of historically subordinated groups. 147 At present, GINA expressly precludes disparate impact actions, 148 thereby only allowing the victims of
larly regulating on-the-job training programs). A similar provision in Title VII laid the
groundwork for that statute's anticlassification interpretation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)-(d) (2006).
144 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
§§ 101(a), 102(a), (b), 103(a), 122 Stat. 881, 883, 888, 892, 896 (codified in scattered
sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). As of 2014, when the Patient Protection and
Accountable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), goes into full effect,
many of GINA's insurance provisions will become obsolete. See FuRRow ET AL., supra
note 15.
145 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); seealsoGriggsv.Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971) ("[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.").
146 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 538 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "disparate impact" as
"[t] he adverse effect of a facially neutral practice (esp. an employment practice) that
nonetheless discriminates against persons because of their race, sex, national origin,
age, or disability and that is not justified by business necessity").
147 While disparate impact claims traditionally have only been employed on behalf
of historically subordinated groups, this tenet of antidiscrimination law may in fact be
changing. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate
Impact Claims by White Males, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1505 (2004) (discussing the historical
development of Title VII disparate impact claims and rejecting the argument for
application of the doctrine to white males).
148 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000ff-7(a) (Supp. II.
2008) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 'disparate impact,' as that
term is used in section 703(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 200e-2(k)),
on the basis of genetic information does not establish a cause of action under this
Act.").
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intentional discrimination to recover. Although not currently
allowing disparate impact claims, GINA provides that six years after its
149
enactment, a commission will revisit this issue.
Because GINA provides individualized protection, prohibits any
consideration of genetic information-positive or negative-and only
outlaws intentional discrimination, the statute currently favors
anticlassification.
C. Benefits of Antisubordination Theory for Genetic Information
Although GINA is largely an anticlassification statute, Congress
drafted it in response to what is ultimately a concern about social subjugation-the fear of a genetically deterministic society. Therefore,
amending GINA to include certain "antisubordination" protections
would better safeguard genetic information. Importantly, given the
comprehensive post-GINA changes to the American health insurance
system effective in 2014,150 the problems and solutions proposed in
this subpart focus primarily on employment discrimination.
To start, under GINA's current provisions, entities could arguably
still use genetic information to limit opportunities; discriminators
would just have to wait until the associated impairment manifests. As
noted, GINA does not protect manifested genetic health conditions.15 1 When a piece of genetic information shifts from being
merely a characteristic of an individual's genotype to a medical condition diagnosable by other means, the resulting health condition does
not constitute "genetic information" and is, therefore, not covered by
149 See id. § 2000ff-7(b) ("On the date that is 6 years after the date of enactment
of this Act, there shall be established a commission, to be known as the Genetic Nondiscrimination Study Commission (referred to in this section as the 'Commission') to
review the developing science of genetics and to make recommendations to Congress
regarding whether to provide a disparate impact cause of action under this Act.").
150 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) includes provisions
designed to eliminate health-status discrimination in health insurance. See, e.g.,

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat.
119, 154 (prohibiting discrimination based on preexisting condition or health status,

prohibiting discrimination against individual participants based on health status, and
banning health insurers in the individual and group markets from setting "discriminatory premium rates"); see also Jessica L. Roberts, "Healthism": A Critique of the
Antidiscrimination Approach to Health Insurance and American Health-Care Reform
(Feb. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=1757987 (arguing that Congress took an antidiscrimination
approach to reforming health care). Thus, manifested genetic health conditions will
enjoy antidiscrimination protection in the context of health insurance.
151 See supra note 94.
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the statute. 15 2 While such policies would affect fewer people and at a
later time in their lives, allowing discrimination on the basis of manifested genetic disorders could still generate a socially subjugated class.
Many individuals who complained of genetic-information discrimination against themselves and their families pre-GINA actually described
discrimination on the basis of a manifested condition.1 53 Additionally, people avoid genetic testing because they fear discovering their,
or their families', genetic proclivity for a disease. 154 Should their test
results reveal an increased risk, knowing that GINA would only protect
them until the disease manifests might compound that fear rather
than alleviate it.
Although the ADA may provide some protection for manifested
genetic health conditions in the context of employment, some individuals could fall through the cracks. The ADA prohibits employment
55
It
discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities.'
defines a "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment."' 5 6 Thus, to qualify as a disability under
the ADA, an impairment must substantially limit a major life activity.' 5 7 In the past, courts have interpreted the definition of disability
very narrowly. For example, courts have previously denied ADA
claims for impairments such as terminal cancer 15 8 and multiple sclero-

152 See Rothstein, supra note 2, at 176 ("This absence of protection for affected
individuals is not a loophole or oversight.").
153 See Email from Pam Kennedy to Amanda Sarata (Aug. 20, 2004, 6:27 PM),
reproduced inPUBLIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 21, at 47 (describing her son's struggles

with ectodermal dysplasia as an example of genetic-information discrimination).
154

Woody Guthrie died of Huntington's disease. His son, Arlo Guthrie, although

having a fifty percent chance of developing the disease, has publically stated he does
not want to be tested. See Don't Permit Abuses of Genetic Testing, USA TODAY, July 19,

1990, at 10A.
155
156
157
bility.
158

See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
Id.§ 12102(2).
Id.If an impairment is not sdibstantially limiting, it does not constitute a disaSee infra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
See Hirsch v. Nat'l Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977, 980-82 (N.D. Ill. 1997)

(denying posthumously an ADA claim because the claimant failed to establish that his
fatal non-Hodgkins lymphoma was substantially limiting); see also Ellison v. Software
Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff with breast
cancer was not substantially limited in the major life activity of working despite the
"nausea, fatigue, swelling, inflammation, and pain she experienced as a result of the
treatment and the medication").
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because claimants failed to establish that those impairments substantially limited them.
Effective in January 2009, Congress amended the ADA to
counteract restrictive court decisions and reinstitute the expansive
definition of disability it originally intended. 160 Although Congress
recognized that determining what constitutes a substantial limitation
previously allowed the courts to restrict the ADA, it was unable to settle on a definition of the term itself, ultimately leaving the question up
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).161 The
EEOC's proposed rules explain that an impairment is a disability
when it substantially limits a person's ability to perform a major life
activity, as compared to "most people in the general population" and
that the impairment need not prevent or severely restrict an individual's ability to perform a major life activity to be substantially limiting. 162 However, the EEOC regulations are merely advisory and do
not bind the courts. Thus, the courts will again have to address the
issue of what constitutes a substantially limiting impairment.
Fortunately, a claimant who has an impairment that does not rise
to the level of a disability, even under the new revisions, could still
recover if she is "regarded as" having a disability. 163 Under the newly
amended ADA, a claimant is regarded as having a disability if she
faced discrimination "because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is persis

ceived to limit a major life activity.

' 164

As a result, the extent of the

159 See Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 884 (6th Cir. 1996)
("Although both arthritis and MS can be disabling in some instances, they were not so
substantially limiting in this case.").
160 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (A) (2006 & Supp. II
2008) (rejecting the courts' narrow definition of disability and stating that "[t]he definition of disability in this chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of
individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this
Act").
161 See Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with DisabilitiesAct:
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. CoLLoQUY 217, 219-20
(2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/44/LRCol1200
8n44Long.pdf.
162 Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,431, 48,440 (proposed Sept. 23,
2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). The regulations also provide a list of
conditions that should consistently constitute a disability, such as autism, cancer, and
cerebral palsy, as well as examples of conditions that may be substantially limiting for
some-but not all-people, like asthma, high blood pressure, learning disabilities,
and carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. at 48,441-42.
163 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
164 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).
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new coverage will depend upon how broadly courts construe the
phrase "because of an... impairment." However, claimants who only
meet the "regarded as" prong of the definition of disability are not
165
entitled to reasonable accommodations.
Depending on how expansively the courts interpret both "substantially limits" and "regarded as," newly diagnosed but asymptomatic
patients may find themselves unprotected. Individuals who take
genetic tests would be more aware of the diseases they might develop
and, therefore, more likely to monitor their health and catch a genetically based health condition early in its manifestation. Depending
upon how the courts apply the ADA, those same people could lie in
the gap between GINA's and the ADA's coverage. 16 6 GINA would not
protect their manifested genetic health conditions, yet those conditions might not yet rise to the level of disabilities. While Congress and
the EEOC did their best to close the potential window between diagnosis and symptoms, the courts will ultimately decide the bounds of
the ADA's protection. Because GINA does not apply to a diagnosable
genetic health condition, an expansive interpretation of the newly
amended ADA is the only possible protection against employment discrimination on the basis of a manifested genetic impairment.
An antisubordination approach would lead to more comprehensive and consistent protection for genetic information. Unlike GINA's
current protections, an antisubordination paradigm mandates including those conditions alongside their underlying genes. Take three
employees. Employee A has a genetic variant giving her a fifty percent chance of developing cancer and she developed cancer two years
ago. Employee B has the same variant and will develop cancer in five
years. Lastly, Employee C has the same variant as Employees A and B
but will never develop cancer. Although all three individuals possess
the exact same genetic information, GINA may not treat them equally.
If a policy discriminates on the basis of their shared genetic variant,
GINA would most likely protect B (who does not presently have cancer but will develop it in five years) and C (who will never develop
cancer), but probably not A (who currently has cancer) because
Employee A would have to differentiate her genetic information from
her associated health condition to have a viable claim. Conversely, an
antisubordination approach to protecting genetic information would
165 Id.§ 12201(h).
166 See Klitzman, supra note 18, at 72 (noting that individuals with mild symptoms
are afraid that neither GINA nor the ADA will protect them); see also Rothstein, supra
note 6, at 839 (noting the possible gap in coverage between GINA and ADA); see also
Maurice Wexler et al., The Law of Employment Discriminationfrom 1985-2010, 25 A.B.A.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 349 (2010) (describing the interplay of the ADA and GINA).
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view Employees A, B, and C all as members of a potential genetic
underclass, regardless of whether they manifest the underlying condition. When B develops cancer in five years, she will not leave the
potential genetic underclass. Rather, she will join an additional
group, people with cancer. Because nothing about her genes will
have changed, she is just as genetically disadvantaged as she was
before. Even if her health status gives her protection against discrimination via health care reform 1 67 and the ADA, offering dual protection makes sense because she is dually disadvantaged. 168 Thus,
according to antisubordination, discrimination on the basis of a manifested genetic disorder is just as problematic as discrimination on the
basis of the genetic information alone.
Antisubordination would also allow positive differential treatment. Employers must be able to consider genetic information to
protect it properly. As mentioned, genetic difference is ubiquitous, 169
and all people carry some unfavorable genetic traits. 170 Because of
the wide range of genetic difference, genetic advantage/disadvantage
exists on a continuum. As a result, society will ultimately determine
which kinds of genes or genetic profiles are "normal" or "desirable."
Of the existing antidiscrimination categories, these qualities make
genetic information most similar to disability. 171 Instead of eliminating disparities, treating people with disabilities exactly like their ablebodied counterparts frequently creates inequality. 172 Thus, equality
for people with disabilities often relies on accommodation,1 73 something that cannot occur without some knowledge of the disability.
Likewise, allowing entities to consider genetic information might actu167 See supra note 150.
168 The EEOC even hints at the possibility of dual protection in its regulations. See
Regulations Under the Genetic Infornmation Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed.
Reg. 68,912, 68,929 (Nov. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1635.11).
169 See Lahn & Ebenstein, supra note 141, at 728 ("[N]o two people's DNA is the

same, except identical twins.").
170

See Capron, supra note 138, at 690 (noting that while all people have poten-

tially fatal genes, those who carry the genes for which genetic screens are first developed will suffer disproportionately).
171 Like the idea of "genetic disadvantage," what constitutes disability is based in
the conceptualization of normalcy. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 656 (1999).
172 See Rovner, supra note 107, at 1057-58; see alsojessica L. Roberts, Note, An Area
of Refuge: Due Process Analysis and Emergency Evacuationfor People with Disabilities,13 VA.

J. Soc. POL'v & L. 127, 137-40 (2005) (arguing that the equal protection demanded
by the Fourteenth Amendment does not do enough to alleviate the difficulties faced
by disabled people).
173

See Rovner, supra note 107, at 1044.
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ally lead to more meaningful equality. Take, for example, a genetic
predisposition to developing carpal tunnel syndrome. GINA's prohibition on classifying on the basis of genetic information would prevent
an employer from treating employees with that variant differently
than employees with another variant. 174 However, treating both
groups identically could result in the carriers' developing carpal tunnel and needing to leave their jobs or take time off to recover while
the group without the variant continues working. Alternatively, if the
employer could consider genetic information, the employees with the
genetic predisposition could work longer hours but with more breaks
to allow their joints to rest or could switch positions throughout the
day.1 75 By treating the employees differently on the basis of their
genetic information, employers could avoid work-related injury and
any resulting gaps in employment. Additionally, allowing employers
to consider genetic information leaves the door open for genetic
diversity initiatives that would teach us to value genetic difference
early in the creation of this new antidiscrimination category. Thus, a
complete ban on obtaining genetic information does not make sense
because it ignores the reality of genetic difference and prohibits the
consideration of genetic information for accommodation or diversity
purposes.

17 6

Further, permitting claimants to recover for facially neutral policies that could produce discriminatory results is important to protecting genetic information adequately. Although genetic-information
discrimination as conceived by GINA is a relatively new phenomenon,
174 Arguably, allowing an accommodation for employees with a genetic predisposition disadvantages the employees without that genetic predisposition. According to
this line of reasoning, providing a more flexible work schedule to employees with a
heightened genetic proclivity for developing carpal tunnel would disadvantage
employees without that genetic variant. This position would be akin to the plaintiff's
successful argument in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2687-89 (2009), holding

that an employer who rejected test results that would have formed the basis of disparate impact claim for its employees of color in so doing discriminated against its white
employees. However, the employer could offer the accommodation universally on

another basis, such as work/life balance.
175 Similarly, Robert Klitzman suggests accommodations for individuals at risk for
alpha-I antitrypsin deficiency, such as limiting possible exposures to environmental
irritants. See Klitzman, supra note 18, at 73.
176 It should be noted that simply allowing the positive use of genetic information

unchecked could lead to systemic advantage on the basis of genetic information, creating a genetic uberclass. While claimants might at some point be able to use disparate impact actions to challenge blanket preferences for uberclass members as
unintended discrimination against nonmembers, those claimants would have to prove
that the positive treatment was creating systematic disadvantage. Thus, it is important
to limit that positive differential treatment to accommodation and diversity initiatives.
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disparate impact on the basis of genetic information is already a real
possibility. For example, scientists have discovered that a gene associated with height is linked to a genetic variant predisposing its carriers
to heart disease.17 7 Severaljobs require that employees be a particular
height. 178 Consequently, height requirements-a traditional area of
sex-based disparate impact claims-could also have a disparate impact
on the basis of certain genetic information unrelated to height itself.
Moreover, because GINA only prevents employers from explicitly discriminating on the basis of genetic information, employers could
introduce policies that screen out undesirable genetic traits using
other signals, either intentionally or unintentionally. 179 Thus, failing
to offer protection against facially neutral policies with discriminatory
results may facilitate the creation of a genetic underclass.
Finally, an antisubordination framework could better target subtle or implicit genetic-information discrimination. A series of small
decisions may accumulate to create large scale disparities. 80 For
example, imagine that an employer learns that an employee has tested
positive for Huntington's. Although the employee may not develop
the disease until years later, the employer might make decisionseither out of self-interest or concern that the individual might not be
"up for" certain tasks-based on the employee's genetic information.
These kinds of minor decisions based on genetic information
18 1
represent a real fear among individuals at risk for genetic disease.
An anticlassification model, which prohibits only intentional discrimi177 See Steve Connor, Newly Discovered Height Gene Has Disease Link, INDEPENDENT,
Sept. 3, 2007, at 12, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-andfamilies/health-news/newly-discovered-height-gene-has-disease-link-401 275.html
(quoting Mike Weedon).
178 A variety of jobs involve height requirements, including automobile manufacturers, fire fighters, police officers, truckers, and pilots. Litigants have challenged
these requirements. See, e.g., Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 568 F.2d 50 (8th Cir.
1977) (pilots); Davis v. Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977) (fire fighters),
vacated, 440 U.S. 625 (1979); United States v. Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218 (N.D. Ill.
1976) (police officers), affd in part, rev'd in part, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977); Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 62 F.R.D. 98 (W.D. Ky. 1973) (automobile manufacturers),
modified, 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,
No. CIV-72-445, 1973 WL 278 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 27, 1973) (truckers).
179 This scenario is more akin to a Title VII disparate treatment claim, in which
the employer designs a facially neutral policy as a pretext for discrimination, than a
claim for disparate impact, which requires no intent. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
180 See Sturm, supra note 127, at 4719-20 (describing "functional equality of
treatment").
181 See supranote 49 and accompanying text; see also Klitzman, supranote 18, at 73
("If the partners knew about this, it might unconsciously affect them: should we make
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nation, may not be able to address the cumulative effect of a number
of small but discriminatory choices, many of which could be occurring
18 2
on an unconscious level.
Although an antisubordination approach has clear benefits, it
may seem counterintuitive to apply this framework absent a widely recognized, lived social category. First, without an existing status hierarchy, it will be impossible to predict exactly how a genetic underclass
might form or operate. However, as noted, we know enough about
the formation of stigma and the process of subjugation through
experiences with other categories to approximate-albeit not with
perfect accuracy-how a genetic underclass might develop. 18 3 Secondly, there is the concern that merely thinking in terms of
antisubordination itself is a step toward creating a genetic underclass.1 8 4 However, when drafting GINA, Congress was legislating in
the shadow of eugenics. The fear of a genetically deterministic society
is already deep in the social imagination, so much so that it currently
leads people to avoid potentially beneficial genetic testing. Because
eliminating the fear of a genetically deterministic society includes
eradicating anxieties regarding a potential genetic underclass,
antisubordination provides a suitable paradigm.
To sum up, including some antisubordination protections is
essential to GINA's success as a statute. The fear of a genetically deterministic society is very much a concern-not just about control over
our lives-but about possible subordination. Importantly, sharing
genetic information can sometimes prevent disadvantage, as in the
contexts of accommodation and diversity. Because we are genetically
different, it makes sense to acknowledge and adjust for those differences. In prohibiting all classifications based on genetic information,
anticlassification does too much. Antisubordination is more in line
with the fears surrounding GINA's passage and is thus better tailored
to alleviate them.
this guy partner? They wouldn't say it. They would just think it to themselves, 'I'm
gonna vote no,' and raise their hand when the 'no' vote comes along.").
182 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1164 (1995) (arguing that Title VII combats intentional discrimination, but not subtie, unconscious biases).
183 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
184 Theorists have proposed that discourse is generative and the very process of

classification creates and reifies difference. See
THINGS (1966); see also JUDITH

MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 180-90 (1999). Thus,

merely acknowledging the possibility of a genetic underclass could lead to genetic
subordination.
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Congress could add antisubordination protections to GINA by
amending the statute to be more like traditional antidiscrimination
statutes. This Article proposes three possibilities: one modeled on
Title VII, one modeled on the ADA, and a hybrid of the two.
1. Title VII as a Paradigm
Congress could take an approach to protecting genetic information more like that of Title VII. Title VII includes both anticlassification and antisubordination protections. Although courts have applied
the statute absent a history of subordination,18 5 the statute allows
claimants to challenge facially neutral policies that generate discriminatory outcomes via disparate impact actions. 18 6 Thus, Congress
could amend GINA to include disparate impact claims while preserving its anticlassification provisions. While this approach would eliminate the previously described problems that result from failing to
cover facially neutral policies, it would not allow accommodations
based on genetic information.
GINA's disparate impact framework could parallel Title VII's process. Under Title VII, after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by
demonstrating that a particular facially neutral policy creates a discriminatory outcome, the defendant has the opportunity to prove that
the contested practice serves a business necessity.18 7 If the defendant
is successful, the plaintiff can then demonstrate an alternative means
to accomplish the desired business objective, but with a less discriminatory result. 18 8 Thus, allowing genetic-information disparate impact
claims would not bar employers from using measures of intelligence
and aptitude, even if those qualities have a genetic basis, because
those factors involve a business necessity: the need to hire qualified
workers. Moreover, genetic-information disparate impact claims
could extend GINA's coverage to manifested genetic health conditions because employment practices that disproportionately impact
individuals with those conditions would also have a disparate impact
on the basis of the underlying genes.
Genetic-information disparate impact claims are a real possibility.
Although Congress banned them when drafting GINA, it indicated a
willingness to consider the need for those actions by establishing a
185 See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 (1976)
(applying Title VII to all races); Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443,
446 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying Title VII to a man).
186

See supra note 145 and accompanying text.

187
188

See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (ii), 2(k)(1)(C) (2006).
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commission to revisit this issue six years from the statute's enactment.18 9 However, a Title VII-based approach would not allow the
positive differential consideration of genetic information. Thus, it has

its limitations.
2.

ADA as a Paradigm

Alternatively, Congress could make GINA more like the ADA. 190
The ADA is, by and large, an antisubordination statute. It seeks to
elevate the status of a particular historically disadvantaged group: 19 1
people with disabilities. The ADA's employment provisions prevent
employers from discriminating "against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability."1 92 A "qualified individual" can perform the essential functions of ajob either with or without accommodation. 193 However, if an individual with a disability poses a "direct threat" either to
herself or others, the ADA does not apply. 194 The ADA only covers
people with disabilities (either past or present) ,195 or people regarded
as having a disability.1 96 People without disabilities, who are not
regarded as having a disability, have no cause of action under the stat189 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. Importantly, simply adding disparate impact actions as proposed by Congress would only affect GINA's employment
provisions, as there are no disparate impact claims for discrimination in health
insurance.
190 Mark Rothstein also endorses an approach to genetic-information discrimination based on the protection of disability. See Rothstein, supra note 100, at 459-60.

Rothstein, however, uses the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, not the ADA
as his model. See id. He argues that adopting a difference-oriented approach could
provide better protection for genetic information than "genome-blind" policies that
attempt to mask the relevance of genetic difference. See id. at 462-63.
191 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (2) (Supp. II 2008) (finding that "historically, society
has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities con§ 12101 (a) (6) (finding that
tinue to be a serious and pervasive social problem"); id.
"people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are
severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally").
192 Id. § 12112(a).
193 Id.§ 12111(8).
194 See id.§ 12113(b) ("The term 'qualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace."); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73,
86-8.7 (2002) (extending the direct threat defense to the individual with the
disability).
195 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (B) (including the record of a disabling impairment
in the definition of disability).
196 See id. § 12102(1) (C) (including being "regarded as" having a disabling impairment in the definition of disability).
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ute. The ADA also allows positive differential treatment for accommodation purposes,' 97 as well as claims for facially neutral policies with
discriminatory results.198 Thus, an ADA-based approach would (1)
provide asymmetrical coverage for members of a potential genetic
underclass, (2) permit positive differential treatment, and (3) allow
challenges to facially neutral policies that produce discriminatory
results. That said, this approach also has substantial weaknesses.
If Congress limited GINA's protections to members of a potential
genetic underclass, the statute would only apply when a qualified individual faced the possibility of systematic disadvantage on the basis of
her genetic information, regardless of intent. Restricting coverage to
"qualified individuals" would bypass cases outside of GINA's intended
scope, such as suits against the National Basketball Association' 99 for
genetic discrimination on the basis of genes linked to height. Much
like how courts determine whether a person has a disability as defined
by the ADA, they could consider whether GINA claimants are members of a potential genetic underclass. GINA would therefore focus
exclusively on adverse actions-intended or unintended-against
qualified individuals that could lead to group disadvantage. Additionally, Congress could build in a direct threat defense that would allow
employers to escape liability if a person's particular genetic profile
would put her or her coworkers at a substantial risk.
Confining GINA's coverage to members of a potential genetic
underclass could also include individuals with manifested genetic conditions. For example, researchers have linked an increased risk for
developing lung cancer to a particular genetic variation. 20 0 However,
several other factors-most significantly smoking-also contribute to
the probability of developing lung cancer.20 1 As a result, discriminat197 Early on in the ADA's history, the EEOC noted that "[o]nly persons who actually have a substantially limiting impairment are entitled to reasonable accommodation under the ADA.... Persons who are regarded as having a substantially limiting
impairment are not entitled to reasonable accommodation." EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,

198

ADA

CASE STUDY TRAINING MANUAL, CASE STUDY 1,

at 6 (1996).

See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (3) (A) (prohibiting practices "that have the effect of

discrimination on the basis of disability").

199 For an in-depth analysis of GINA's potential impact on sports employers, see
Evans, supra note 6.
200 See Denise Gellene, Genetic Link to Cancer Found, L.A. TIMES, April 3, 2008, at

A12.
201

The study shows that smokers generally have a fifteen percent chance of devel-

oping lung cancer. See id. While smokers with one copy of the variation have roughly
the same probability of cancer as smokers without the variation, smokers with two
copies of the genetic variation have an increased risk: they have a twenty-five percent
chance of developing cancer. Id.
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ing against people with lung cancer might not lead to a genetic underclass because those other factors are in play-a person with lung
cancer could still, of course, recover under the ADA. Conversely, discriminating on the basis of Huntington's disease could lead a genetic
underclass to form because all individuals who carry the particular
genetic variant develop the disease. While it need not be as exact as in
Huntington's, the correlation between an underlying gene and an
associated health condition could inform whether discriminating on
the basis of the manifested genetic disorder might lead to a genetic
underclass. Furthermore, in those cases in which a potential claimant
could sue under both GINA and the ADA simultaneously for the same
violation, Congress could cap the overall damages.
In addition to asymmetrical protection, an ADA-based approach
would allow positive differential treatment on the basis of genetic
information. For example, people could offer their genetic information to receive reasonable accommodations at work. Covered entities
could, therefore, only use genetic information insofar as it would benefit the individual offering it.
Although amending GINA to resemble the ADA has its benefits,
there are also serious disadvantages. For instance, an ADA-based
approach leaves the scope of GINA's protection to the courts, which
could interpret it very restrictively, as they initially did with the ADA.
Moreover, limiting coverage to members of a potential genetic underclass invites individualized discrimination. To escape liability, an
employer only needs to demonstrate that its discriminatory action
would not lead to systematic genetic disadvantage. This defense would
create a hole in GINA's coverage akin to "personal animus" in Title
20 2
VII cases.
3.

Best Case Scenario

The best strategy for protecting genetic information combines
the ADA-based and Title VI-based approaches with GINA's current
structure. 203 To assure people that their genetic information will not
lead to discrimination, GINA must alleviate fears both of social
genetic determinism and of violations of genetic privacy. GINA's cur202 Title VII does not bar discrimination based on personal animus. See St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993). Thus, an employer can escape
liability by proving that the adverse action was the result of personal animus, not
discrimination.
203 Combining different kinds of statutory protections can inform how the
Supreme Court interprets a law. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Co.,
513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995) (holding that courts have treated the ADEA as a hybrid of
Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938).
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rent protections are well equipped to address the latter: prohibiting
the requiring and requesting of genetic information ensures that most
genetic information will stay private. 20 4 However, from an antidiscrimination perspective, GINA is presently too much of an anticlassification statute. Outlawing any consideration of genetic information
and failing to cover manifested genetically based conditions may actually lead to systematic genetic disadvantage. Adding antisubordination protections to GINA would allow the statute to better address
concerns of social genetic determinism. Although the ADA and Title
VII both provide useful templates, neither statute on its own presents
a workable framework. The ideal means of protecting genetic information would borrow antisubordination elements from both the ADA
and Title VII, while maintaining GINA's ban on requesting or requiring genetic information.
Like the ADA, ideally GINA would allow positive differential
treatment for the purposes of accommodation, as well as genetic
diversity initiatives. Offering that information would be completely
voluntary: people could disclose their genetic information only when
it would benefit them. Allowing employers 20 5 to consider genetic
information under limited circumstances would allow individuals to
reap the benefits of genetic testing without the fear of discrimination,
as well as help cultivate a respect for genetic diversity.
However, simply adopting an ADA approach would not provide
the best protection for genetic information. In particular, providing
asymmetrical coverage would likely leave the question of whom GINA
protects to the courts, creating many of the same difficulties encountered with the ADA. Thus, the ideal protection for genetic information would incorporate some, but not all, aspects of the ADA.
Additionally, the best protection for genetic information would
cover facially neutral policies that produce a discriminatory result.
Allowing genetic-information disparate impact claims would ensure
that employers could only implement policies that negatively impact
people with certain genetic traits when those policies are a business
necessity. Thus, beyond targeting unintentional genetic-information
discrimination, disparate impact claims would prevent employers
from using facially neutral policies to screen out unfavorable traits.
204 Kim, supra note 6, at 703 ("[Slimply prohibiting discrimination alone is
unlikely to be effective in preventing discrimination on the basis of genetic
characteristics.").
205 Arguments could be made in favor of allowing positive differential treatment
in health insurance as well. For example, health insurers could tailor coverage based
on health needs (not potential cost). However, that proposal would also involve fundamental changes to the PPACA and is therefore outside the scope of this Article.

2011]

GINA

AS

AN

ANTIDISCRIMINATION

LAW

Moreover, disparate impact claims would also cover people with manifested genetic conditions, offering dual protection when those conditions also qualify as a disability. However, GINA's disparate impact
provision applies only to employment discrimination. Thus, Congress
could experiment with ways to protect manifested genetic conditions
and prevent unintentional or facially neutral genetic-information discrimination in the insurance context until health care reform takes
full effect.
Importantly, GINA should retain some of its anticlassification
protections. Keeping the prohibition on requesting or requiring
genetic information preserves people's genetic privacy and gives them
control over when to disclose their genetic information. Preventing
health insurers and employers from asking for genetic information
but simultaneously allowing a person to choose when she wishes to
disclose that information gives an individual complete authority over
her genetic identity.
In sum, the ideal protection of genetic information would allow
positive differential treatment for accommodation and diversity initiatives and claims for disparate impact-all while leaving prohibitions
on requesting or requiring genetic information intact. GINA should,
therefore, combine antisubordination elements with its existing
anticlassification structure to offer the best protection for genetic
information possible.
CONCLUSION

Although genetic information is undeniably a new kind of
antidiscrimination category, traditional antidiscrimination theory provides the proper analytical framework for understanding its protections. While Congress took a predominantly anticlassification
approach, incorporating antisubordination elements would greatly
improve GINA by better addressing the underlying concerns surrounding protecting genetic information in the first place. However,
an antisubordination approach has benefits beyond the scope of this
Article.
We are entering a world in which parents can select their babies'
eye colors 20 6 and companies offer genetic dating services. 20 7 While
health insurance and employment are part of the picture, the potential problem of genetic-information discrimination extends far
206 See Gautam Naik, A Baby, Please. Blond, Freckles-Hold the Colic, WALL ST. J., Feb.
12, 2009, at A10.
207 See, e.g., GENE PARTNER, http://www.genepartner.com (last visited Apr. 21,
2011) (offering matchmaking based on a DNA analysis).
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beyond those areas. Schools, banks, government entities, and even
restaurants and movie theaters could still discriminate on the basis of
genetic information. Anticlassification as a paradigm can be applied
very narrowly. It prohibits certain entities from using certain traits in
making certain decisions. Conversely, by making the prevention of a
genetic underclass its purpose, antisubordination implicates a greater
social project. An antisubordination framework compels us to consider how genetic information might lead to systematic social disadvantage and to react accordingly. Put simply, antisubordination tells
us where GINA falls short. Thus, in addition to improving GINA's
current protections, an antisubordination paradigm advocates
expanding GINA past the current bounds of the statute to alleviate
concerns of genetic-information discrimination beyond health insurance and employment.

